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Environmental law was born out of the new scientific understandings
of ecology in the mid-twentieth century. Although science has historically
played an important role in environmental law, its role has been more limited
than may seem appropriate for an area of law that is so dependent on science
to inform sound decision making. Environmental law has not taken full
advantage of the plethora of scientific ideas developed in universities and
other research institutions throughout the world.' Unfortunately, these new
scientific ideas that could inform and improve environmental decision
making rarely seem to find a home in the legal arena.
An example of a well-developed scientific idea that has the potential
to benefit environmental decision making is "emergy synthesis." Emergy
synthesis provides a method to value natural resources and ecosystem
services in a way that captures their inherent value, rather than relying on
consumer preferences and other neoclassical-economic approaches to assign
them a dollar value. Emergy synthesis could improve environmental
decision making under several existing environmental statutes. A few
examples where emergy synthesis could play an important role include
informing alternatives analysis under the National Environmental Policy Acte
(NEPA), informing cost-benefit analysis, providing a methodology to value
services under ecosystem-services-payment programs, and providing useful
information under wetlands-regulatory programs to determine if mitigation
proposals adequately offset impacted wetlands. Unfortunately, despite the
potential benefits of incorporating emergy synthesis into environmental
law-and despite the widespread use of emergy synthesis by the scientific
community for more than thirty years-legal scholars, practitioners, and
regulators have failed to even consider it as an option. While admittedly
more work would need to be done to determine what role emergy synthesis
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. I would
like to thank Wendy Wagner, Alyson Floumoy, Elizabeth Rowe, and Christine Klein for helpful
suggestions; Christina Storz, Brandon Richardson, and Ryan Feinberg for excellent research
assistance; and the Texas Law Review.
1. See Michael E. Soul6 et al., Strongly Interacting Species: Conservation Policy, Management,
and Ethics, BIOSCIENCE, Feb. 2005, at 1, 1 (describing how environmental laws and regulations
quickly become obsolete because they fail to keep up with new scientific developments).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000).
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should play in environmental decision making, it is curious that a well-
developed scientific idea with such potential benefits has almost completely
slipped under the radar screen of the legal and policy communities.
Emergy synthesis is just one example that illustrates the reluctance
or inability of the law to incorporate certain scientific ideas that could greatly
advance efforts aimed at sound environmental decision making. While some
scientific ideas have easily found a home and proliferated in environmental
law, others wait on the sidelines for someone to take notice. One example of
a scientific idea that has become ubiquitous in environmental law is that of
"risk assessment," a mainstay in modem environmental law. An example of
a scientific idea that has received much attention by scientists, regulators,
resource managers, and legal scholars, but that has not yet found a home in
the law, is that of "adaptive management."
Why do some scientific developments easily gain a foothold in the
law while others, which appear to have the potential to be equally useful,
remain unknown or unutilized? A number of factors appear to limit the
ability of environmental law to adapt to and incorporate new scientific
developments that could greatly improve environmental decision making.
Some of these factors reflect the inherent conflicts between science and law,
while others are more specific to the scientific idea at issue. This Article
seeks to identify some of the factors that influence whether scientific ideas
are integrated into the law and to explore ways in which the law could be
more accepting of potentially beneficial scientific ideas. This Article begins
by reviewing the ways in which science informs and enhances environmental
law, as well as the barriers that often inhibit new scientific developments
from being used in environmental law. While recognizing that barriers and
opportunities exist in a number of legal forums, including the judicial setting
and the legislative setting, this Article focuses on barriers and opportunities
in the administrative-rulemaking and policy-development settings.
To illustrate how legal scholars, lawmakers, environmental agencies,
and practicing lawyers have attempted to incorporate new scientific
developments into environmental law, particularly in the administrative
context, this Article traces the journeys of three distinct scientific
developments-risk assessment, adaptive management, and emergy
synthesis-from scientific academia to environmental administrative law.
These three scientific developments were chosen because, although all three
are relatively recent developments, they have had unique journeys and
varying degrees of success in being incorporated into the law. Risk
assessment has been embraced by regulatory agencies and has become an
integral part of environmental law. Adaptive management, on the other
hand, while endorsed by scientists and legal academics, has not yet
successfully found a home in the law. Finally, emergy synthesis-although
it has existed for more than thirty years, has been widely accepted in the
scientific community, and has the potential to transform environmental
decision making-has been largely ignored by the legal community. Using
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the framework put forth in the book The Tipping Point3 to evaluate why
some ideas catch on and others do not, this Article then explores the reasons
why the law has treated these different scientific developments in such
dramatically different ways. The Article concludes by making observations
about what types of scientific developments are most likely to be
incorporated into the law and suggesting ways for improving the likelihood
that new beneficial developments will be adopted to inform the law.
1I. The Importance of Science in Environmental Law (Why We Should)
Environmental law is a system consisting of numerous statutes,
regulations, policies, and court decisions that attempts to reduce or eliminate
certain harms to humans and the environment. To reduce or eliminate harm,
it is necessary to understand the harm by gaining an understanding of, among
other things, the following: whether the risk of harm exists; what the nature
of the harm is; under what circumstances or at what levels of exposure the
harm is likely to occur; how the risk of harm changes as circumstances
change or as levels of exposure change; what technologies, processes, or
alternatives can be employed to reduce the risk of harm; how effective those
technologies or processes are at reducing that risk; and how cost-effective the
different alternatives are. Science can provide information that can help to
answer virtually all of these questions.
Of course, the role of science should not be overstated. Science can
play an important role in informing decision making, but it cannot answer
policy questions, such as how much risk we are willing to tolerate or how
much money we are willing to pay to reduce a risk. Pure science may tell us
what is likely to happen as a result of a certain action, but it cannot in itself
tell us whether that outcome is "good" as a matter of policy. On the other
hand, a policy decision about a desired outcome is worth little without
scientific information demonstrating whether a particular action is likely to
achieve the desired outcome. Because of the stark difference between their
two disciplines, lawyers and scientists go about solving problems in ways
that do not always make sense to one another. However, there is no question
that both are needed to have sound environmental decision making.
The natural world is complex and ever-changing. As the science of
ecology has blossomed over the past several decades, our understanding of
the uncertainties and complexities inherent in the natural world has grown.
Sophisticated scientific understanding is needed to understand how human
activity impacts the natural world. Questions regarding the extent of an
impact, the long-term implications of an impact, and the ability of the natural
world to recover from a particular impact simply cannot be answered without
the assistance of science. Neither science standing alone nor law standing




alone can fully address the environmental issues we face. Ultimately,
environmental decision making must be based on an integration of science
and policy.
III. The Disconnect Between Law and Science (Why We Don't)
The uneasy relationship between science and law flows from the
inherently different purposes and processes of the two disciplines, which are
not easily harmonized.4 The purpose of science is to seek the truth, whereas
the purpose of the law is to seek justice or at least reasonable and fair
resolution to disputes.' The scientific process relies on the ability to test
hypotheses through the scientific method.6 No matter the inspiration for a
scientific hypothesis, every scientific hypothesis ultimately must be subjected
to testing and found to be reproducible to be accepted.7 The critical factor in
determining whether something is science is whether, at least in theory, it is
falsifiable.8 In other words, in theory the hypothesis could be disproved by
an experimental result.9 Law, on the other hand, by its very nature deals with
human behavior, ° which is profoundly more difficult to subject to
falsification through experimentation." Another critical distinction is that
4. For analysis of some barriers separating law and science, see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW (1999) (focusing on the law's
impatience with the limitations of scientific methods); STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW
AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA (1994) (discussing the paradoxical contrast between the United States'
vigorous support for scientific research and its slow and sporadic implementation of the results of
that research); STEVEN GOLDBERG & LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, LAW AND SCIENCE (2006)
(evaluating the relationship between law and science, particularly with regard to genetics, nuclear
energy, medicine, and computers); Joseph F.C. DiMento & Helen Ingram, Science and
Environmental Decision Making: The Potential Role of Environmental Impact Assessment in the
Pursuit of Appropriate Information, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283 (2005) (reviewing alternative
explanations of the sometimes troubled relationship between science and environmental decision
making); Richard V. Pouyat, Science and Environmental Policy-Making Them Compatible,
BIOSCIENCE, Apr. 1999, at 281, 281 (describing some of the most challenging barriers separating
ecological and biological science and public policy); Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up
(More or Less), and What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273 (2005)
(assessing the role of science in a maturing, modern environmental law).
5. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 5-11 (1995) (contrasting the cultures of legal and scientific inquiry by noting that "fact-
finding in the law is always contingent on a particular vision of... delivering social justice," while
"science is ordinarily seen as set apart from all other social activities by virtue of its institutionalized
procedures for overcoming particularity and context dependence and its capacity for generating
claims of universal validity").
6. GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 7; see Daniel J. McGarvey, Merging Precautions with Sound
Science Under the Endangered Species Act, BIOSCIENCE, Jan. 2007, at 1, 1 (describing how
hypothesis tests aim to minimize type I errors (false positives), whereas the goal of environmental
decision making typically is to prevent type II errors (false negatives)).
7. GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 7.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 13.
11. See id. at 14 ("Human history does not lend itself to the running of controlled
experiments.").
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while science emphasizes cumulative progress in understanding the world-
each experiment builds on previous ones to increase cumulative
knowledge-law emphasizes "process."' 12  In other words, law's primary
purpose is to resolve human disputes rather than to continually add to a body
of testable knowledge.
13
One of the biggest challenges of the legal system is to be able to address
the uncertainty inherent in science, which may result from a lack of data,
inconsistent data, or conflicts in the interpretation of data. 14 Many gaps and
uncertainties exist in the scientific information relied upon to make
environmental policy decisions.15 Some of the gaps are due to the fact that
many areas simply have not been fully studied as a result of limited funding
for environmental studies, the low likelihood of being able to reap future
profits from environmental studies, or mere lack of interest. 16 Other areas
that have been studied may still present uncertainty because studies may have
inconsistent results or because experts who review the studies may have
conflicting interpretations of the quality, meaning, and significance of the
studies. 17  Finally, many scientific studies in the environmental arena are
influenced by political pressure, business pressure, or the impacts of
advocacy science that are inevitable when profit-making motives are pitted
against environmental or public-health protection. 18
Although a significant amount of literature exists examining the often
uneasy relationship between law and science, the vast majority of it focuses
on the use of science in the courtroom. 9 Specifically, much of the literature
12. Id. at 13-20.
13. Id.
14. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's
Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 438-39 (2004) (stating that uncertainty in
science is unavoidable); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 145, 148-52 (2003) (describing
some of the uncertainties that exist in current environmental science); John M. Volkman, Managing
Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 723-24 (1999) (stating that
there is much uncertainty in species-conservation policy); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance:
The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment,
53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1625-33 (2004) (describing the lack of scientific research and data on
environmental problems); Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-
science Organization ": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Facfinding in the Growth
Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 258-62 (1998) (describing the kinds of scientific
uncertainty prevalent in risk assessments).
15. Wagner, supra note 14, at 1625-30.
16. Id. at 1631-33.
17. See Doremus, supra note 14, at 438 ("Choices of how to interpret equivocal data and what
to do in the face of uncertainty are not 'scientific' as the public understands that term, although they
are familiar to scientists and indeed are an unavoidable part of the scientific enterprise.").
18. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 14, at 1631-32. ("[Private) actors vastly prefer ignorance
over research because most documentation of externalities will ultimately affect them negatively.
Thus, rather than contribute to enlightenment, actors seem more willing to contribute to, and even
invest in, the perpetuation of ignorance.").
19. See, eg., DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION
OF SCIENCE IN LAW, at xiii (2006) ("Our focus in this book is on the current use of science in the
2008] 1531
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involves the use of expert witnesses and the challenges judges and juries face
in determining the quality of scientific evidence.2 ° In the courtroom setting,
the role of science has been limited by the "gatekeeping" role assigned to
judges to determine the reliability of the scientific evidence. The fallout of
the 1993 case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,21 which
solidified this gatekeeping role, has been to create a high hurdle that must be
overcome before expert scientific testimony will be permitted in the
courtroom. Moreover, judicial proceedings require that, in most civil cases,
scientific issues be demonstrated by the party bearing the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence, just like any other factual matters must be.22
Accordingly, for a party, such as an environmental regulatory agency or
environmental organization, to overcome the Daubert hurdle and to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that its scientific position
should prevail is extremely challenging.23 Another obvious reason why law
and science have such an uneasy relationship in the courtroom is that the
great majority of judges and juries are not educated in the hard sciences and
do not have the technical expertise necessary to fully understand, interpret,
and apply scientific evidence.24 Moreover, the rapid technical advances in
the sciences make it difficult for even those so inclined to keep up with new
developments. 25 It is no wonder that courts are loathe to accept new cutting-
edge scientific developments.
In the administrative-rulemaking arena, it is relatively easy to
incorporate new or different scientific ideas as compared to the courtroom
setting. If an agency, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
decides to utilize a new scientific approach, very few legal barriers or
challenges exist. There is no Daubert-type requirement that the approach be
shown to be reliable before it will be allowed. 6 To the extent anyone is
playing a gatekeeping role, it is the agency itself. Moreover, if the agency
promulgates a rule based on a new or different scientific approach, the
courtroom."); JASANOFF, supra note 5, at xiii ("My purpose is to explore how ... science and the
courts[] interact with each other....").
20. JASANOFF, supra note 5, at xiii.
21. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). A recent Westlaw search of law review articles containing the word
"Daubert" in their titles found 547 such articles.
22. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 n.10 (noting that, when determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence, factual issues "should be established by a preponderance of proof'); JASANOFF,
supra note 5, at 10 ("In order to prevail the plaintiff must prove his claim by a 'preponderance of
the evidence'-in other words more than 50 percent of the evidence must be in the plaintiff's
favor.").
23. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 5, at 120 ("It is difficult to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that such commonly occurrng complaints as leukemia, birth defects, loss of fertility,
and neurological or psychological disorders resulted from contact with one or another toxic
substance.").
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information
Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 589, 591-92 (2004).
[Vol. 86:15271532
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standard of review of the agency action generally will be the arbitrary and
capricious standard-barring agency action for which there is no reasonable
rationale-which at least in theory should be hard to meet.27
Due to the ease with which agencies should be able to incorporate new
scientific ideas into their rule and policy development, at least from a purely
legal perspective, it is unclear why agencies such as EPA have not taken
advantage of the many potentially beneficial scientific ideas that have come
out of universities and other research institutions in the United States and
throughout the world. The arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial
review should in theory result in courts being highly deferential to agency
rulemaking and policy development, including in the area of incorporating
new or different scientific ideas into agency decision making. However, as
other scholars have demonstrated, courts have expanded their role in
arbitrary and capricious review via the "hard look" doctrine, which has
contributed to regulatory ossification.28 As explained by Professors Lynn
Blais and Wendy Wagner elsewhere in this Issue, the fear that courts will
scrutinize and strike down their decisions has contributed to the reluctance on
the part of agencies to develop new rules or to revise existing rules to take
into account new technological developments. 29  Likewise, such fears are
likely to inhibit agencies from attempting to utilize new scientific ideas. Of
course, agencies are subject to political pressures that may influence their
willingness to look to the world of science for new ideas. Moreover, it is
possible that simple bureaucratic inertia makes agencies slow to adopt new or
different ideas. Nevertheless, regardless of the political leanings of a
particular administration or the general slow pace of government action,
27. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (setting standards for judicial review of agency action); see also
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983)
(requiring that agencies take a "hard look" at the data, arguments, and alternatives before making a
final decision); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971)
(requiring an agency to base its decision on the whole record, not on "merely post hoc
rationalizations").
28. Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 525, 527-29 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts
on "Deossifying " the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410-12 (1992); see also Thomas
0. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of Environmental
Modeling, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,751, 10,770 (2003) (analyzing thirty years of
judicial challenges to EPA rulemakings to identify the types of constraints the court imposed under
the Administrative Procedure Act).
29. Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1701, 1706 (2008); see also Wagner, supra note
26, at 603-04 (stating that placing stricter scientific burdens on agencies will cause them to avoid
promulgating new regulations). Scholars have also identified the increased oversight role of the
Bush Administration's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its "sound science" crusade
as a major factor in regulatory ossification. See, e.g., Roni A. Neff & Lynn R. Goldman,
Regulatory Parallels to Daubert: Stakeholder Influence, "Sound Science," and the Delayed
Adoption of Health-Protective Standards, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S81, S87 (2005)
(describing how the charade of "sound science" hampers the government's ability to safeguard the
public's health and well-being).
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agencies are receptive to some new scientific ideas, but they curiously appear
to be reluctant to consider other scientific developments that may help
address the many difficult challenges faced by the agencies.
IV. The Use of Science in Environmental Law (How We Have)
Although for the foregoing reasons the relationship between science and
environmental law has been strained, historically the law has readily
incorporated certain scientific ideas, developments, or approaches, while
completely ignoring or even shunning others. For example, risk assessment
is a scientific approach that has found a home in many aspects of
environmental law and policy. Other scientific ideas, such as adaptive
management, while widely discussed in the legal academic literature, have
not yet found a strong foothold in the law and are put to limited use in only
certain aspects of environmental decision making. Emergy synthesis, a
scientific idea whose origins date back more than fifty years, is widely
accepted in the scientific academic community, holds great promise as a tool
to inform environmental decision making, and yet has barely shown up as a
small blip on the environmental law and policy radar screen. This Article
asks the question: Why are some scientific ideas embraced by the legal and
policy world, while others that appear to be of equal if not greater utility,
such as emergy synthesis, are ignored? To attempt to find some patterns, this
Article looks at the history of three scientific ideas-risk assessment,
adaptive management, and emergy synthesis-to attempt to discern patterns
relating to acceptance by the legal and policy communities.
A. Emergy Synthesis
Emergy analysis was developed by Howard T. Odum as part of a broad
theory regarding the role of energy in systems derived from Alfred Lotka's
"maximum power principle" from the 1920s. 30 It appears that Odum's first
foray into the concept of emergy began in the 1950s when he, along with his
brother Eugene, defined the crucial role of energetics in ecology.31 As part
of their work on energetics, the Odum brothers acknowledged that the
"quality" and not merely the "quantity" of energy is significant.32 The
Odums' recognition that there was a need for a "common denominator" for
describing different kinds of energy led H.T. Odum to use the term
30. See HOWARD T. ODUM, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING: EMERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISION MAKING 15-21 (1996) (introducing the concept of emergy and citing to Lotka's
maximum power principle); Alfred J. Lotka, Contribution to the Energetics of Evolution, 8 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 147, 147-49 (1922) (presenting the maximum power principle).
31. See generally EUGENE P. ODUM & HOWARD T. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY
(1953).
32. Mark T. Brown & Sergio Ulgiati, Energy Quality, Emergy, and Transformity: H. T. Odum's
Contributions to Quantifying and Understanding Systems, 178 ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 201, 201-
02 (2004). Energetics is "a branch of mechanics that deals pnmarily with energy and its
transformations." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 413 (1lth ed. 2003).
[Vol. 86:15271534
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"embodied energy" to mean the amount of one kind of energy required to
make the same amount of another.33 Odum abandoned the term "embodied
energy" because it was being used by others for some different purposes and
instead adopted the term "emergy." 34 Emergy is now commonly understood
to capture the idea of energy memory, or in other words, how much of one
type of energy is required to make another.35
During the 1970s, H.T. Odum refined his ideas and developed the
concept that is now known as "emergy synthesis, ' 36 which has been further
expanded and refined by other scholars over the past thirty years.37 Emergy
synthesis provides a methodology to value resources or services based on
their "intrinsic" value rather than based on consumer preferences.3 s Emergy
synthesis is considered a "donor" value system because it is based on the
principle that the energy that goes into creating a resource or service
determines its value. 39 Although emergy synthesis has reached a high level
of sophistication and is accepted and used by scientists worldwide,4° to date
it has not found a place in the legal or policy arena.41
33. Brown & Ulgiati, supra note 32, at 202-03.
34. Id. at 203.
35. Id. at 205 ("Emergy is the availability of energy (exergy) of one kind that is used up in
transformations directly and indirectly to make a product or service.").
36. A partial list of Dr. H.T. Odum's emergy publications includes H.T. ODUM, ENERGY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: A GUIDE TO THE ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS (1988); HOWARD T.
ODUM ET. AL., ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY IN FLORIDA (1998); HOWARD T. ODUM,
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING: EMERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING (1996);
HOWARD T. ODUM & ELISABETH C. ODUM, A PROSPEROUS WAY DOWN: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES (2001); Howard T. Odum, Embodied Energy, Foreign Trade and Welfare of Nations, in
INTEGRATION OF ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY-AN OUTLOOK FOR THE EIGHTIES 185-99 (A.M.
Jansson ed., 1984); Howard T. Odum, Folio #2: Emergy of Global Processes, in HANDBOOK OF
EMERGY EVALUATION: A COMPENDIUM OF DATA FOR EMERGY COMPUTATION ISSUED IN A
SERIES OF FOLIOS (2000); Howard T. Odum, Self-Organization, Transformity, and Information, 242
SCIENCE 1132 (1988).
37. The emergy Web site at the University of Florida alone lists more than 300 publications by
University of Florida faculty and graduate students related to emergy synthesis. See Emergy
Systems.org, Publications, http://www.emergysystems.org/ publications.php (last updated Jan. 26,
2008).
38. Mark T. Brown & Sergio Ulgiati, Emergy Evaluation of the Biosphere and Natural Capital,
28 AMBIO 486, 487 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Jorge L. Hau & Bhavik R. Bakshi, Promise and Problems of Emergy Analysis, 178
ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 215, 216 (2004).
41. During the early years of emergy research, at least one lawmaker considered using emergy
in environmental or energy decision making. For example, in his book, ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTING, Odum states:
In 1975 our initiatives through Senator M. Hatfield of Oregon caused a federal law to
be introduced requiring "net energy analysis" of new projects. Because the words
"energy" and "embodied energy" were not clearly defined, the implementation of the
law became confused and its purpose of preventing wasteful projects was
circumvented. While noting the illegal substitution of economic analysis for energy
analysis, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1982) reviewed energy analysis
methods describing three approaches: process analysis; input-output analysis; and our
approach, which they called "ecoenergetics." They wrote:
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One potential benefit of emergy synthesis over currently used
methodologies is that it eliminates the need to employ neoclassical-economic
approaches to value resources or services. Whether, or how, to assign
economic value to natural resources and systems has been one of the most
controversial areas of environmental law for decades.42 Economics plays a
role in many areas of environmental law. For example, most environmental
regulatory statutes impose a requirement that either cost-benefit balancing or
feasibility analysis be used to determine pollution-control standards.43 In
addition, economic analyses, such as cost-benefit balancing, are often used
to choose between competing project sites or project alternatives.44 Recently,
with the development of ecosystems-services payment programs, economics
has taken on an even greater role.45  However, the use of economics in
Ecoenergetics has broad appeal in its emphasis on the fullest possible
measurement of the embodied energy of labor, environmental systems, and solar
energy, but its analytical boundaries are more extensive than seems appropriate
for the analysis of alternative energy technologies, as we explain at greater
length [elsewhere]. Moreover, a set of consistent quantitative methods has yet to
be developed for it. Therefore we chose not to use ecoenergetics.
ODUM, supra note 30, at 277-78 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/IPE-82-1, DOE FUNDS NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT
ESTIMATING POTENTIAL NEW ENERGY YIELDS, at summary (1982), available at http://archive.gao.
gov/f0 102/119139.pdf ("GAO recommends that the Congress require DOE to consider the potential
net energy yields of proposed technologies and to provide the analytic support needed to implement
net energy analysis.").
42. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 9 (1999) ("I argue for a pragmatic approach to environmental
problems, in which economic analysis is useful, but not controlling.... [T]he dichotomy between
economics and value judgments turns out to be a false one."); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 1-2 (2003)
(descnbing U.S. environmental, health, and safety laws as historically based on preventative risk
regulation and noting the many critics who find risk regulation irrational because it often leads to
solutions whose economic costs are much greater than their economic benefits).
43. See FARBER, supra note 42, at 7 (noting that President Reagan issued an order in 1981
requiring all government agencies to base their decisions on cost-benefit analysis except when
prohibited from doing so by statute); see also id. at 119 (noting that feasibility analysis is employed
in certain EPA regulations that direct a particular firm to achieve the specific level of pollution
control it considers feasible).
44. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH
AT EPA § 3.4 (2008), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epalib/ordl.nsf/77e34926d19d5664852565a5005
0led6/6f63dca022f9544585256625006ccdc8!OpenDocument ("When economic information cannot
be used to set the regulatory goal, policy makers at a minimum would like that their regulations
achieve the goal at least cost. In a great many cases, [EPA] does have the discretion to select the
most cost-effective approach from among regulatory approaches that yield equivalent outcomes.").
45. See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of "The Fragile Land System,"
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Fall 2005, at 3, 69 (describing an ecosystems approach based on proof
of economic harm); James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services,
21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133, 135-36 (2006) (discussing the economic problems associated
with public goods and collective action as one barrier to creating markets in ecosystems services);
James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
870, 870 (2005) ("In recent years, an increasing number of initiatives around the world have sought
to create markets for [ecosystem] services, some dependent on government intervention and some
created by entirely private ventures."); James Salzman, The Promise and Perils of Payment for
1536 [Vol. 86:1527
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46environmental law is not without controversy. The criticism of the use of
economics in environmental law is in large part attributable to the fact that it
relies on neoclassical economics to value ecological resources and services. 7
The shortcomings of using neoclassical-economic analysis in
environmental law have been well documented.48  One of the most
significant shortcomings is the difficulty of assigning a dollar value to many
environmental resources and services using neoclassical-economic methods.
Most ecological resources and services are not bought and sold on the market
and consequently do not have a market value. 49  Neoclassical economics
attempts to place a dollar value on such nonmarket resources by using
"contingent valuation" to determine consumers' willingness to pay for that
resource or service. 50 Many criticize the use of contingent valuation because
many question its assumption that environmental values are significant only
to the extent that consumers are willing to pay to preserve them. 51  The
problems with assuming that a resource's value is only determined by how
much a consumer is willing to pay are manifold. First, contingent valuation
assumes that consumers have perfect information and adequate technical
Ecosystem Services, I INT'L J. INNOVATION & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 5, 5 (2005) (identifying different
types of ecosystems-service markets and examining the challenges posed by each).
46. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 42, at 6-8 (describing the argument over how best to protect
the environment between proponents of cost-benefit analysis and proponents of environmental
values).
47. John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 332
(1995); see also HERMAN E. DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS 24-26 (2003) (describing the circular flow model-the pre-analytic vision of
standard economics-and its shortcomings); FARBER, supra note 42, at 52-53 (noting criticisms of
basing environmental policy on market preferences that highlight the "stark division between the
interests people have as private consumers and those they have as citizens").
48. See FARBER, supra note 42, at 35 (noting that "[m]uch of the environmental scholarship of
the past twenty years has been dominated by the struggle between" political and economic
approaches).
49. Because there are no significant markets for most environmental services, cost-benefit
analyses, preparation of environmental impact statements, wetlands mitigation banking, Superfund
remediations, and oil-spill cleanups often ignore these services. James Salzman, Barton H.
Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law,
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 311-12 (2001).
50. See FARBER, supra note 42, at 49 (noting that "some economists advocate the use of
'contingent valuation' studies to measure how much people are willing to pay for nonuse values");
Heyde, supra note 47, at 339 ("Contingent valuation is a public opinion surveying technique:
surveyors ask members of a sample group how much they would be willing to pay to restore a
resource to its undamaged state. The results are then aggregated ... to provide a statistical picture of
how much society as a whole values the resource in question.").
51. See FARBER, supra note 42, at 49 ("There is a great deal of dispute about whether
contingent valuation, even if done carefully, provides a genuine measure of
preferences.... [Clritics doubt that people actually have preferences about specific environmental
sites or that their responses reflect considered efforts to assess such preferences."); Heyde, supra
note 47, at 333 ("Courts and natural resource trustees should abandon contingent
valuation.... [O]bsession with the 'perfect' damages figure tends to commodify our understanding




understanding to determine how much money they would be willing to pay
for an ecological resource or service, even one as complex and as little
understood as, for example, nutrient cycling. In addition, researchers have
demonstrated that the concept of "willingness-to-pay" typically used in
contingent valuation is inherently skewed toward valuing the right to use
resources rather than the right to preserve resources, 52 and that generally, the
amount that consumers are willing to pay to protect a resource is only about
one-half of the amount that the same consumer would be willing to accept to
allow the resource to be exploited.53 Perhaps, most significantly, however,
many have argued that consumer preference has nothing to do with the
importance of the ecological resource or service for sustaining life on earth.54
Many ecological goods and services are not assigned any value by
neoclassical-economic analysis and thus are rarely included in any
meaningful way in traditional cost-benefit analysis. Scientists have been
working to develop alternative methods for assigning a value to ecological
resources and services for many years.55 Emergy synthesis is one of these
alternative valuation methodologies, which provides a valuation
methodology that relies on science rather than on consumer preferences.
Emergy synthesis has numerous advantages over neoclassical-economic
systems of assigning value to resources and services. Emergy synthesis is
based on the principle that the energy embodied in a resource or service
determines its value. As such, it relies on the intrinsic value of resources and
services. Emergy synthesis rejects contingent valuation, a measure of what
emergy proponents characterize as a "receiver" system of value, in favor of a
donor system of value. A donor system of value based on solar energy
required to produce things rejects the underlying assumption of neoclassical-
economic valuation, which suggests that value stems only from utilization by
humans.56
Scientific scholars have analyzed emergy synthesis and have found it to
have a number of benefits over traditional approaches.57 For example,
52. FARBER, supra note 42, at 99-101.
53. Id. at 100.
54. Brown & Ulgiati, supra note 38, at 493.
55. See, e.g., DALY & FARLEY, supra note 47, at 29 (arguing that consideration of the linear
throughput of resources in an economy should be added to the traditional circular flow model).
56. Brown & Ulgiati, supra note 38, at 486.
57. CHARLES 0. HOLLIDAY, JR. ET AL., WALKING THE TALK: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 83-85 (2002) (describing the benefits of "eco-efficiency," a
methodology similar to emergy synthesis in that eco-efficiency recognizes the inherent value of
natural resources and seeks to minimize the amount of that value used in producing goods and
services). For discussions of the benefits of other concepts that comprise emergy synthesis, see
Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment, 268 SCIENCE
520, 521 (1995) (arguing that traditional economic policy is not an adequate substitute for
environmental policy that takes into account the planet's carrying capacity); Bhavik R. Bakshi, A
Thermodynamic Framework for Ecologically Conscious Process Systems Engineering, 24
COMPUTERS & CHEMICAL ENGINEERING 1767, 1767-68 (2002) (arguing that traditional process
engineering considers environmental objectives as secondary to economic objectives but that
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emergy synthesis has been lauded in that it provides a bridge that connects
58economic and ecological systems. Since emergy can be quantified for any
system, its economic and ecological aspects can be compared on an objective
basis that is independent of its monetary perception.5 9 Emergy synthesis
compensates for the inability of money to value nonmarket inputs in an
objective manner.6° Moreover, emergy synthesis has been praised for being
scientifically sound and sharing the rigor of thermodynamic methods, for
utilizing a common unit which allows all resources to be compared on a fair
basis, for recognizing the different qualities of energy, and for providing a
more holistic alternative to many existing methods of environmentally
conscious decision making.6'
Although criticisms have been leveled at emergy synthesis, they are
primarily based on a lack of understanding on the part of the critics, on
insufficient communication of emergy theory outside of the scientific world
by emergy scholars, on a lack of clear links with related concepts in other
disciplines, and on the types of general criticisms that are often directed at
new, groundbreaking ideas.62
One of the fundamental benefits of emergy synthesis is that it represents
a new model for a new science that, rather than bridging multiple disciplines,
incorporates those disciplines in itself. Emergy synthesis integrates
economic and scientific values into one metric.63 Moreover, emergy values
resources and services in an objective scientific manner that does not rely on
consumer preferences.64 Accordingly, emergy synthesis appears to provide a
very useful methodology that could inform the difficult decisions that must
be made in the face of less-than-perfect data.
emergy theory properly accounts for both objectives); Paul Ekins et al., A Framework for the
Practical Application of the Concepts of Critical Natural Capital and Strong Sustainability, 44
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 165, 166 (2003) (stating that traditional economic models do not properly
account for nonpnced, common-property environmental resources).
58. See Bakshi, supra note 57, at 1767 (stating that emergy combines the benefits of both
economic and ecological analysis).
59. Hau & Bakshi, supra note 40, at 218.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 223 (reviewing criticisms of emergy and concluding that many of the criticisms apply
not just to emergy analysis but to all methods that employ a holistic view). Publications that
provide criticism of emergy analysis include: DANIEL T. SPRENG, NET ENERGY ANALYSIS AND THE
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OF ENERGY SYSTEMS 289 (1988); Cutler J. Cleveland et al., Aggregation
and the Role of Energy in the Economy, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 301, 313 (2000) (stating that
econometric analysis of energy use reveals a strong correlation between energy use and economic
output and demonstrates that economic performance is not decoupled from energy use); B.A.
Mansson & J.M. McGlade, Ecology, Thermodynamics and H.T. Odum's Conjectures, 93
OECOLOGIA 582, 588-92 (1993) (criticizing the use of energy as a currency to describe ecology).
63. Mary Jane Angelo & Mark T. Brown, Incorporating Emergy Synthesis into Environmental
Law: An Integration of Ecology, Economics, and Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 963, 974 (2007).
64. Id. at 984-85.
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Among the most promising uses of emergy synthesis are as a way to
inform decision making on the severity of environmental impacts on an
ecosystem, and as a way to choose which is the most environmentally
efficient of two or more proposed options for development or restoration. 65
Analyzing all of the emergy inputs and outputs to the ecosystem under each
option can tell us which option results in the most emergy loss or gain.
Emergy synthesis can provide an objective measure of inherent value
that does not rely on consumer preferences. However, emergy synthesis
should not be viewed as a panacea. The information resulting from emergy
synthesis, while extremely useful, should not be viewed as providing any
absolute answers. The emergy value of a resource or a service, in itself, does
not tell you whether that resource or service is good or bad, merely that it
possesses a certain level of embodied energy and therefore would require that
level of energy to replace.66 The question of whether that resource or service
is good or bad is a matter of policy. For example, a pesticide such as DDT,
which is made from fossil fuels and requires a large amount of energy to
make, has a relatively high emergy level; however, this fact does not say
anything about whether DDT is good or bad. The fact that DDT has a high
emergy level, however, does provide useful information. High-emergy
substances have the ability to have high levels of impacts. 67 Thus, a high-
emergy substance, such as DDT, has the potential to have a high impact to an
ecosystem.68 Whether that impact is something desirable, such as controlling
pests, or undesirable, such as bioaccumulation in the food chain, however, is
a matter of public policy.
To date, emergy synthesis has only been used in a very sporadic, ad hoc
manner in environmental decision making. Although the emergy accounting
procedure has not been used by environmental regulators in the United
States, the United Nations Environment Programme has used emergy
synthesis as part of a project to restore West African drylands and improve
rural livelihoods. 69 Researchers have also used emergy synthesis in a wide
variety of case studies. 70 Although emergy synthesis has not been integrated




69. U.N. ENv'T PROGRAMME, AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO RESTORING WEST AFRICAN
DRYLANDS AND IMPROVING RURAL LIVELIHOODS THROUGH AGROFORESTRY-BASED LAND
MANAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.worldagroforestry.org/
wadrylands/resources/West/ 20African%20Drylands%2OProject.pdf.
70. In one case, researchers evaluated three alternative sources of water supply for Windhoek,
Namibia: aquifer water, Okavango River water, and desalination. See Andrrs A. Buenfil, Emergy
Evaluation of Water Supply Alternatives for Windhoek, Namibia, in INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS.
ANALYSIS, POPULATION-DEVELOPMENT-ENVIRONMENT IN NAMIBIA: BACKGROUND READINGS
187 (Ben Fuller & Isolde Prommer eds., 2000), available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/
pde/docs/IR-00-03 I.pdf. The study demonstrated that the use of aquifer water was the preferable
alternative primarily due to the environmental and economic costs of desalination and the
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into the culture of EPA, it is interesting to note that EPA offers a two-week
emergy short course 71 and that in 2005 EPA published a report entitled
Environmental Accounting Using Emergy. Evaluation of the State of West
Virginia.72 Perhaps not surprisingly, the EPA employee responsible for the
course and the report is a former graduate student of Dr. Odum.
Given the potential benefits of emergy synthesis to many areas of
environmental decision making-coupled with the fact the emergy synthesis
has been in existence for decades, has reached a high level of sophistication,
is accepted and used by scientists throughout the world, and has been used in
the international arena-it is curious that U.S. environmental agencies such
as EPA have not undertaken a serious evaluation of the idea.
B. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment entails "evaluation of scientific information on the
hazardous properties of environmental agents and on the extent of human
exposure to those agents. 73 Risk assessment provides information for use in
risk management. Risk assessment is comprised of two components, hazard
and exposure, 74 and is a four-step process. 75 First, the hazard is identified to
downstream environmental impacts to the Okavango Delta wetlands and wildlife should water from
the Okavango River be diverted. Id. In another case study, researchers evaluated three effluent
treatment alternatives for wastewater discharge from an existing pulp and paper mill in Florida:
constructing a pipeline to pipe wastewater from the mill to the Gulf of Mexico; piping water to the
headwaters of an existing wetland for treatment by the existing wetland system; or constructing a
new wetland strand between the mill and the Gulf of Mexico, through which wastewater would be
discharged. EMERGY EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ALTERNATIVES 6-35, http://www.emergy
systems.org/downloads/PowerPoints/Lecture 10_EnvEvaluation.ppt. Finally, Dr. Odum conducted
an emergy synthesis evaluating two alternatives for cooling-water disposal from a nuclear power
plant in Crystal River, Florida: (1) the construction and operation of cooling towers, and (2)
discharging the hot waters to the adjacent estuarine ecosystem. Taking into account a number of
factors-including the ecological costs of impacts to zooplankton and juvenile fish, and reduction in
ecological metabolism-and comparing these to the emergy costs of construction, maintenance, and
operation of the cooling tower, the emergy analysis demonstrated that direct discharge of cooling
water into the bay was the better alternative. Id. at 36-39.
71. ATL. ECOLOGY DIV., EPA, EMERGY, http://www.epa.gov/aed/html/collaboration/emergy
course/presentations/index.html.
72. DANIEL E. CAMPBELL & SHERRY L. BRANDT-WILLIAMS, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCOUNTING USING EMERGY: EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA (2005), available at
http://epa.gov/nheerUpublications/files/wvevaluationposted.pdf.
73. COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 25-26 (1994) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND
JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT] (defining risk assessment).
74. Keith J. Jones, Endocrine Disruptors and Risk Assessment: Potential for a Big Mistake, 17
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 357, 370 (2006) ("Environmental risk assessment is usually described in terms of
two components-hazard and exposure."). See also MARY O'BREN, MAKING BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 17-25 (2000) (describing hazard and exposure in further detail).
75. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH,
COMM'N ON LIFE SCIs., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROGRESS (the "Red Book") 19-20 (1983) [hereinafter RED BOOK]
(dividing risk assessment into four major steps). Alternatively, some approach risk assessment as a
three-step process. Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools for Environmental Justice: Articulating a Net
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determine the qualitative nature of the adverse consequence.76 Examples of
such identified hazards include death, cancer, neurological effects,
reproductive effects, and birth defects. Hazard identification is done using
toxicological, epidemiological, and other scientific tests.7 7 The second step
is to determine the relationship between levels of exposure and probable
adverse consequences.78 In the case of chemical risk assessment, this step
involves determining the adverse effect expected from exposure to a certain
dose of the chemical. 79 The third step is quantification of exposure. 80 The
amount of the contaminant or other hazard that individuals and populations
are likely to be exposed to is determined in this step.8' Finally, the hazard
information and exposure information are combined to characterize the risk
in probabilistic terms. For example, the risk may be described as 1 x 10-6,
meaning that if one million people are exposed to the chemical, one will
contract cancer.
82
Risk assessment has been used by federal agencies in their decision
making since before the creation of EPA. 83 In fact, the term risk assessment,
in its broadest sense, encompasses any attempt, whether quantitative or
qualitative, to evaluate and weigh the likelihood of a particular hazard
occurring. Under this broad view of risk assessment, it can be said that risk
assessment dates back to early man. In its more commonly recognized form
in environmental law, however, modem risk assessment dates back to the
mid-1970s and grew out of techniques used by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to assess health risks from food additives beginning in
the 1940s and 1950s. 84 To carry out its mission of evaluating the safety of
food additives under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act,85 FDA developed a
number of risk-quantification techniques that form the basis of modem
Health Effects Challenge to Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
203, 214 (2001) ("Risk assessment can be conceived of as a three-part process."); see also Elaine
M. Faustman & Gilbert S. Omenn, Risk Assessment, in CASARETT & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE
BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 107 (Curtis D. Klaassen ed., 7th ed. 2008) (discussing risk assessment
generally).
76. RED BOOK, supra note 75, at 19.
77. See id. at 20, 22-23 (discussing epidemiological data, animal-bioassay data, short-term
studies, and comparisons of molecular structure in hazard identification).
78. Id at 19-20.




83. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, 29-30 (discussing the
historical roots of risk assessment).
84. See id. (noting that the origins of risk assessment are found in the practices of toxicologists
in the 1940s and that the concept was then adopted by FDA scientists in the 1950s).
85. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
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environmental risk assessment.86 Starting in the early 1940s, toxicologists
began studying how to establish limits on exposure to hazardous substances
to protect human health.87 The rationale behind establishing exposure limits
was that "all substances could become harmful under some conditions of
exposure-when the so-called threshold dose was exceeded-but ... human
health could be protected as long as those exposure conditions were
avoided., 88  Occupational-health scientists began establishing acceptable
exposure limits based on short-term toxicity observations in highly exposed
work.89  However, scientists were not sure how to set threshold doses for
large, diverse human populations and widely varying chemicals.
90
Quantitative risk assessment gained a foothold at EPA starting in the
mid-1970s, as EPA was tasked to make risk-based determinations under the
plethora of new environmental statutes adopted by Congress. 91 By the 1980s
a number of federal agencies had begun to employ quantitative risk
assessment.92 Several factors contributed to the widespread use of risk
assessment beginning in the 1980s.
First, the large number of new environmental and health-protective
statutes passed by Congress in the 1970s and early 1980s forced agencies
such as EPA to develop methodologies to evaluate risk in their decision
making. The possibility that carcinogenic substances might act through
nonthreshold mechanisms, where exposure to even one molecule is
associated with a small but non-zero increased risk of tumor induction, led to
86. See, e.g., SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 30 (noting two
FDA scientists' work to establish "acceptable daily intakes (ADIs)[] for dietary pesticide residues
and food additives").
87. Id. at 29.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 30. For example, threshold limit values (TLVs) were first published by the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists in the 1950s. Id. In the early 1950s, a procedure
known as acceptable daily intakes (ADIs) for dietary pesticide residues and food additives was
proposed by two FDA scientists, O.G. Fitzhugh and A. Lehman. Id. This procedure is based on the
above stated threshold hypothesis and-originally-on identification of a chemical's no-observed-
effect level (NOEL). Id. The response levels used today are no-observed-adverse-effect level
(NOAEL) and lowest-observed-adverse-effect level (LOAEL). Id. The FDA scientists established
the safety factor of 100 when they cited data "suggesting that 'average' human sensitivities might
be up to 10 times those of laboratory animals and that some members of a large and diverse human
population might be up to 10 times more sensitive than the 'average' person." Id. A chemical-
specific ADI was derived by dividing the experimental NOEL by 100. Id. However, the FDA
scientists who established this safety-factor method of risk assessment never claimed that an ADI
was risk-free, but that it carried "reasonable certainty of no harm." Id. (citation omitted). Margin of
safety, which is a variation of the safety-factor approach, involves a judgment of whether an
estimated ratio of the NOEL to actual exposures is acceptable. Id. The procedure for setting ADIs
is still the basic procedure for establishing exposure limits today. Id. at 31. This method was
recommended by National Resource Council committees in 1970, 1977, and 1986 and adopted by
the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization and World Heath Organization expert committees on
food additives and pesticide residues in 1965 and 1982. Id. at 30-31.
90. Id. at 29-30.
91. Id. at 32.
92. Id. at 33.
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the use of dose-response models.93  Scientists avoided identifying
"acceptable" levels of carcinogen intakes through the 1960s and 1970S. 94
However, by the mid-1970s, a systematic approach for regulating
carcinogens was clearly needed. 95 At that time, federal agencies, particularly
FDA and EPA, began adopting methods for quantifying low-dose risks
associated with chemical carcinogen exposure.9 6
By the late 1970s, the increased trend of risk assessment in carcinogen
regulation led to several agencies working together as the Interagency
Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) to create risk-assessment guidelines.97
The participating agencies made no commitment to adopt risk assessment but
would use the approach in the IRLG guidelines if they did decide to use risk
assessment. 98 By the 1980s, risk assessment had taken on an importance in
regulatory agencies that caught the attention of industry. 99 The Supreme
Court's decision in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institutel°° (Benzene) was an impetus for the development of risk
assessment by signaling that some form of quantitative risk assessment was
required as a prerequisite to deciding whether a risk was large enough to
merit regulation.' °1 Thus, in 1981, the National Research Council (NRC)
was instructed to undertake a study of federal agency use of risk
assessment. 10 2 This study was more of a synthesis of the earlier work of
federal agencies, including EPA, and did not recommend a specific method
of risk assessment. 10 3 Many of the recommendations made by the study have
been implemented by EPA, including maintaining a clear conceptual
distinction between risk assessment and risk management and developing
93. Id. at 31. The National Research Council promoted these models in its series of reports
entitled Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Id. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission later
incorporated these models into its regulatory decision making. Id. The earliest legislative
acknowledgment of the possibility that carcinogens may act through nonthreshold mechanisms was
the "Delaney clause" of the Food Additive Amendments of 1958. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 32. Carcinogenicity testing began increasing rapidly in the late 1960s, regulators
began dealing with many newly identified carcinogens in commercial products in the 1970s, and
analytic chemists began identifying carcinogens at lower and lower concentrations. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Work Group on Risk Assessment, Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group,
Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 63 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 241, 258-65 (1979) (describing mathematical models and analytical methods for
quantifying human cancer risk).
98. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 32; Work Group on Risk
Assessment, Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, supra note 97, at 245.
99. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 33.
100. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
101. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 33.
102. Id. at 33; see RED BOOK, supra note 75. This study, known as the "Red Book," continues
to be the basis for EPA's risk-assessment paradigm. See, e.g., 1 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL/CONG.
COMM'N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT., FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
RISK MANAGEMENT 23-28 (1997) (detailing current risk-assessment strategy at EPA).
103. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 33.
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guidelines detailing the scientific basis of risk assessment. 10 4 In 1983, when
President Reagan appointed William Ruckelshaus as EPA Administrator,
Ruckelshaus made risk assessment a top priority, and under his direction, risk
assessment became an integral part of virtually every program administered
by the Agency. 105
After the release of the 1983 NRC Report, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) issued a comprehensive review of the scientific
basis of risk assessment of chemical carcinogens in 1985.106 This review
adopted the risk-assessment framework recommended in the 1983 NRC
Report and provided federal agencies a basis for developing the guidelines
also recommended by NRC. 10 7 EPA was the only federal agency to adopt a
set of carcinogen risk-assessment guidelines as recommended. 10 8 In 1986
and 1987, EPA published risk-assessment guidelines for mutagenicity,
developmental toxicity, effects of chemical mixtures, and human exposure.10 9
In 1988, EPA published risk-assessment guidelines for female reproductive
risk, male reproductive risk, and exposure-related measurements." 10 Finally,
revised guidelines for development toxicity and revised guidelines for human
exposures were published by EPA in 1991 and 1992, respectively.' It was
104. Id. at 34.
105. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1319 (describing Ruckelshaus's push for EPA "to formulate a set of agency-
specific generic cancer guidelines" and his support for standardized, science-based risk-assessment
assumptions); see also William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Spring 1985, at 19, 28-29 ("The explicit and open codification suggested by the NRC will
... offer[] the possibility that one day all the protective agencies of government will speak with one
voice when they address risks, so that estimates of risk will be comparable among agencies and the
public at last will be able to make a fair comparison of the individual risk-management decisions of
separate agencies."); Interview by Dr. Michael Gorn with William D. Ruckelshaus, Adm'r, EPA
(Jan. 1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/ruck/21.htm (last updated Sept.
21, 2007) ("To the extent I began the process of risk-based decisionmaking within the agency, I
consider this a major achievement. I believe it started when we embraced the [1983 NRC Report].
We began to use its principles in establishing priorities in the agency, and in managing the major
risks society faced and EPA attempted to regulate.").
106. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 34.
107. Id.
108. Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (Sept. 24, 1986);
SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 34.
109. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 34-35; see Guidelines
for Mutagenicity Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,006 (Sept. 24, 1986); Guidelines for the Health
Risk Assessment of Chemical Mixtures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,014 (Sept. 24, 1986); Guidelines for the
Health Assessment of Suspected Developmental Toxicants, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,034 (Sept. 24, 1986);
Guidelines for Estimating Exposures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,042 (Sept. 24, 1986).
110. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 35; see Proposed
Guidelines for Assessing Female Reproductive Risk, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,834 (June 30, 1988);
Proposed Guidelines for Assessing Male Reproductive Risk and Request for Comments, 53 Fed.
Reg. 24,850 (June 30, 1988); Proposed Guidelines for Exposure-Related Measurements and
Request for Comments, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,830 (Dec. 2, 1988).
111. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 35; see Guidelines for
Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798 (Dec. 5, 1991); Guidelines for
Exposure Assessment, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,888 (May 29, 1992).
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at this time that EPA also published its groundbreaking report, Reducing
Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection. 1 2
Today, EPA's National Center for Environmental Assessment (NCEA)
is responsible for providing guidance on how pollutants may impact human
health and the environment.' 13 Additionally, NCEA administers the Global
Change Research Program and the Integrated Risk Information System
Program.
114
Currently, risk assessment is used in virtually every area of
environmental law. EPA uses risk assessment to guide decisions covered by
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA).' 15 Its most
significant role is in establishing dose-response relationships for chemical
substances, such as pesticides, contaminants in drinking water, and air
pollutants. 16  Such dose-response relationships are critical to characterize
and quantify risk for subsequent risk-management decisions.
C. Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is defined as an "iterative, incremental decision
making process built around a continuous process of monitoring the effects
of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.""' Adaptive management
is iterative in that it relies on adjusting actions based on new information
112. See ScI. ADVISORY BD., EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
113. National Center for Environmental Assessment, EPA, NCEA Basic Information, http://cf
pub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/aboutncea.cfm?ActType=AboutNCEA (last updated June 18, 2007). For a
listing of current risk-assessment guidelines, see National Center for Environmental Assessment,
EPA, Risk Assessment Guidelines, http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm? deid=55907
(last updated Aug. 23, 2006).
114. National Center for Environmental Assessment, EPA, NCEA Basic Information, supra
note 113.
115. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 35-36 (highlighting
EPA's adoption of risk assessment as a guide to decisions under various statutory schemes);
Matthew D. Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1121, 1156-59 (2005) (noting the use of risk assessment under CERCLA and FIFRA);
see also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1976, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1 36y (2000);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 7 67 1q
(2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2000).
116. See SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, at 39-40 (noting that
once a chemical is found to be potentially hazardous, the next step is to use risk assessment to
establish dose-response relationships).
117. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation By Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 28 (2005).
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gleaned through monitoring." 8 It strives to characterize uncertainty though
multi-model inference and Bayesian inference."
19
The concept of adaptive management was developed in the 1970s and
1980s by two ecologists, C.S. Holling and Carl Walters, at the University of
British Columbia. 120  Later, Holling, while the director of the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, Austria, further
developed the approach. 12 1  Although the adaptive management concept
originated from the works of Holling and Walters in the 1970s and 1980s,
122
it can be traced back to Charles E. Lindblom's article, The Science of
"Muddling Through," published in 1959.123 Holling incorporated the
concept of resilience into policy design as an alternative to environmental
assessment, 124 which he found to be a "reactive approach" that "[would]
inhibit laudable economic enterprises as well as violate critical environment-
tal constraints." 1 25 Holling described adaptive management as "integrat[ing]
environmental with economic and social understandings at the very
beginning of the design process, in a sequence of steps during the design
phase, and after implementation."'
126
Walters described adaptive management as a way to deal with scientific
uncertainty when managing renewable resources, especially since resource
managers had begun relying on quantitative modeling as a tool to predict
118. Id. at 30.
119. Wikipedia, Adaptive Management, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptive-Management
(last modified Mar. 1, 2008).
120. See generally INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
121. See generally INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, supra note 120 (exemplifying
Holling's work on adaptive management while at IASA).
122. Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriers to the Restoration of Aquatic Systems and the
Utilization of Adaptive Management, 23 VT. L. REV. 177, 186 (1998); see also INT'L INST. FOR
APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, supra note 120, at 1-2 (proposing adaptive environmental assessment and
management as an alternative to traditional environmental assessment); WALTERS, supra note 120;
Bradley C. Karkkamen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults:
Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 948-56 (2003) (identifying a number of
distinct variants on the concept of adaptive management, including scientific-hypothesis testing,
macro-adaptation, and adaptive management as used by federal agencies).
123. 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959) (advocating the successive limited comparisons method
as an alternative to the rational comprehensive method of decision making by public
administrators).
124. INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SyS. ANALYSIS, supra note 120, at 19-20. The concept of
resilience, as an overall criterion for policy design, embraces variability:
The more that variability in partially known systems is retained, the more likely it is
that both the natural and management parts of the system will be responsive to the
unexpected. The very process and techniques we recommend, while aimed in part at
reducing uncertainty, are designed as a changing adaptive process of policy design.
Id.




responses to alternative harvesting policies.12 7  According to Walters,
renewable-resource scientists had made major errors by not putting greater
emphasis on socioeconomic dynamics in their research and management and
in their approach to dealing with scientific uncertainty. 128  Instead of
cautiously regulating harvests while seeking better understanding through
more and more detailed analyses, Walters suggested using an adaptive
management process "where management activities themselves are viewed
as the primary tools for experimentation."
'129
The need for an adaptive approach to management became apparent in
light of a new understanding of ecosystems as being "dynamic and stochastic
rather than in equilibrium."' 30  Since then, government agencies have been
trying to account for the disparity between science and environmental law
and to formulate a system that can adjust to confront scientific uncertainty. 3'
However, environmental regulation that can provide "feedback loops to
update regulatory efforts as information increases" is "counterintuitive for
the American legal system, which puts a premium on firm rules of law."'
132
Thus, adaptive management has not been seriously incorporated into
environmental law.' 
33
Environmental law often requires that regulation be based upon the
"best available scientific knowledge," which is a principle of ecosystem
management. 134  According to J.B. Ruhl, "[e]cosystem management is
exactly what it sounds like-managing ecosystem-level problems through
ecosystem-level approaches-and it almost always calls for creative and
adaptive use of policy instruments as varied as inflexible commands at one
127. WALTERS, supra note 120, at vii.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id. at 2-3.
130. Timothy H. Profeta, Managing Without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in Light of
EcologicalAdvances, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 71, 71 (1996); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122-23 (1994) ("[T]he equilibrium paradigm has been rejected in ecology and
replaced with a complex, stochastic nonequilibnum one.").
131. Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A
Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 493 (1996) ("The law tends to
encourage regulatory inaction in the face of uncertainty."). Adaptive management is being
recognized and adopted in varying degrees by federal government agencies responsible for
managing natural resources, including the National Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS), the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers,
and the Bureau of Land Management. Coleman, supra note 122, at 187. Federal agencies have
been using adaptive management for the restoration of critical ecosystems, such as the Pacific
Northwest Forests, the Colorado River, and the Everglades. Id.
132. Profeta, supra note 130, at 86.
133. Id.; see also Coleman, supra note 122, at 178 ("The legal challenge is to maintain enough
flexibility for institutions to manage systems that are in a constant state of flux, while providing the
legal certainty required to satisfy procedural and substantive due process.").
134. Ankersen & Hamann, supra note 131, at 492.
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extreme to generous incentives at the other."1 35 Adaptive management, also
a principle of ecosystem management, 136  "increasingly has become
synonymous" with ecosystem management. 37  Although the concept of
adaptive management has not yet been integrated into environmental
regulatory programs, it has been used in a number of resources-management
programs. For example, the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, considered the first application of adaptive management in resource
management, 138 was the world's largest biological-restoration program in
1986.139 Intensive management of the Columbia River Basin began with the
listing of several Snake River salmon populations as endangered. 140
Congress passed the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, 141  which established the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power and Conservation Planning Council (the Council). 142  The Act
mandated that "[t]he Council shall promptly develop and adopt.., a
program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife .... [T]he
program, to the greatest extent possible, shall be designed to deal with that
river and its tributaries as a system."'' 43 The Act also requires that fish and
wildlife are accorded "equitable treatment" with the multiple purposes of the
135. J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered
Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2004). Edward Grumbine provided the following
working definition of ecosystem management: "Ecosystem management integrates scientific
knowledge of ecological relationships within a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward
the general goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term." R. Edward Grumbine,
What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
136. Ankersen & Hamann, supra note 131, at 492.
137. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean
Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HoUS. L. REV. 933, 999 (1997).
"[V]irtually every collection of domestic ecosystem management principles, however varied,
explicitly incorporates adaptive management as a guiding principle." Ankersen & Hamann, supra
note 131, at 494. Grumbine found that adaptive management was one of the dominant themes
emerging from a review of ecosystem-management articles in peer-reviewed journals up to 1993.
Grumbine, supra note 135, at 29-31.
138. Aikersen & Hamann, supra note 131, at 495.
139. Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 431-33 (1986). See generally John M.
Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly. Columbia River Salmon, the
Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249 (1993) (discussing the
proposal and implementation of adaptive management principles in the Columbia River Basin Fish
and Wildlife Program).
140. Profeta, supra note 130, at 91.
141. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h
(2000)).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a) (2000); Lee & Lawrence, supra note 139, at 435. See generally
Northwest Power Planning Council, http://www.nwcouncil.org/Default.htm (describing the mission
and purpose of the Northwest Power Planning Council and providing updates on its progress).
143. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(l)(A).
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hydroelectric projects. 14 4  Finally, the Act requires that the "best available
scientific knowledge" be used.
145
The Council adopted an adaptive-management policy as part of its
action plan. Agencies involved included the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of
Engineers. 146  Professor Kai Lee, a member of the Council, suggested
adaptive management in 1984.147 The Council found that using adaptive
management as a policy framework "recognizes biological uncertainty, while
accepting the congressional mandate to proceed on the basis of the 'best
available scientific knowledge.'
148
In 1992, NRC conducted a study on the use of adaptive management for
the restoration of aquatic ecosystems. 149  The study has been cited as an
example of how legal academics view adaptive management in terms of how
resource management should be conducted.150 The study suggested using the
adaptive environmental assessment (AEA) developed by C.S. Holling as an
appropriate "process for involving scientists, resource managers, policy
analysts, and decision makers interactively in designing resource
management problems."15 1  In formulating its national restoration strategy,
the NRC established adaptive management as a principle for priority setting
144. Lee & Lawrence, supra note 139, at 436-37; see 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(l 1)(A)(i) (providing
that fish and wildlife protected by the Act receive equitable treatment from the federal agencies
responsible for operating or regulating hydroelectric facilities on the Columbia River or its
tributaries).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B).
146. Lee & Lawrence, supra note 139, at 436-37; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(l 1)(A) ("Federal
agencies responsible for managing, operating, or regulating Federal or non-Federal hydroelectric
facilities located on the Columbia River or its tributaries shall ... tak[e] into account at each
relevant stage of decisionmaking processes to the fullest extent practicable, the program adopted by
the Council ... ").
147. Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 139, at 1255.
148. Lee & Lawrence, supra note 139, at 435. Another example of the use of adaptive
management is with the Glen Canyon Dam. The Glen Canyon Dam serves to store water and
generate power. Tarlock, supra note 130, at 1143. The construction of the dam altered the flow of
the river below the dam, resulting in decreased sediment deposits that build canyon beaches;
decreased river temperature; and fluctuating releases of water-all of which threaten listed
indigenous fish. Id. The resulting political pressure forced the Bureau of Reclamation to prepare
$88 million worth of scientific studies, which then forced the Departments of the Interior and
Energy to prepare environmental impact statements (EISs) for the operation of the dam. Id. The
operating agencies have adopted adaptive management in order to be able to experiment with flow
regimes and satisfy the NEPA EIS requirement. Id. (citation omitted).
149. See COMM. ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 357-58
(1992) [hereinafter RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS] (describing the adaptive-
management methodology); Tarlock, supra note 130, at 1140 ("A recent National Research
Council-National Academy of Sciences study captures the essence of adaptive management .... ).
150. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 122, at 187 (citing a description of adaptive management
from the 1992 NRC study).
151. RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 149, at 345.
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and decision making in the face of scientific uncertainty.152  The example
used by NRC was Chesapeake Bay's nutrient-management strategy, in which
the initial goal was set to reduce nutrient loading by 40%. 153  The policy
makers committed to a continuous study of the goal itself, as well as the cost
and effectiveness of the chosen means.154  As a result, both the goals and
approaches of the nutrient-management strategy are subject to revision over
time. "'
Federal agencies have used adaptive management in a number of
resource-management and restoration programs. For example, the U.S.
Forest Service expressly adopted adaptive management in its plan governing
federal lands in Oregon, Washington, and northern California.156 As part of
the Everglades restoration program, the Army Corps of Engineers adopted
adaptive management. 157  The Army Corps of Engineers used adaptive
management as a tool to confront the ecological uncertainties in deciding
what a restored Everglades ecosystem should look like. 5 8  Moreover, the
congressional mandate to experiment with water deliveries to the Everglades
National Park from the Central and Southern Flood Control Project is cited
as one example of "legislative authorization to pursue an adaptive
management policy."' 59 A final example is the Army Corps of Engineers'
2001 adoption of the concept of adaptive management that was published in
the Revised Draft Environmental Impact Statement (RDEIS) for the Missouri
River Master Water Control Manual (Master Manual). 160
152. Id. at 357.
153. Id. at 358. Concerns over declining fisheries and rising pollutants in the bay arose in the
1970s. Profeta, supra note 130, at 89. In 1975, Congress authorized a five-year study of threats to
the Bay, and in 1983, Congress formed a structure to govern the ecosystem. Id. at 89-90. These
efforts to protect the Bay eventually evolved to incorporate adaptive management in order to fill
informational gaps. Id. at 90. The program had some success but failed to identify the exact
relationship between water-quality levels and habitat health. Id.
154. RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 149, at 358.
155. Id.
156. Profeta, supra note 130, at 91. The goal of the plan was to resolve the conflicts arising
between the protection of the spotted owl as an endangered species and timber harvesting. Id.; see
also Ankersen & Hamann, supra note 131, at 495 (descnbing many efforts to reconcile biodiversity
protection with industry in the Pacific Northwest). The plan designates adaptive management areas
(AMAs) and regulates on the basis of ecosystem units. Profeta, supra note 130, at 91-93. The
governance of the AMAs eventually evolved into a decentralized system in order to address
ecosystem complexity and allow public input. Id at 93.
157. Ankersen & Hamann, supra note 131, at 492.
158. Id.
159. Ankersen & Hamann, supra note 131, at 498. "The 1984 legislation authorized the Corps,
in conjunction with the water management district, to experiment with deliveries of water to the
Everglades National Park based on a concept referred to as the 'rainfall plan."' Id. The goal of the
experiment was to develop an optimum water-delivery plan for the Everglades National Park. Id. at
498-99. The Army Corps selected a "modified rain-driven plan" and initiated consultation with
FWS under § 7 of the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 499. FWS authorized the Army Corps of
Engineers' preferred alternative through an incidental-take permit. Id.
160. John H. Davidson & Thomas Earl Geu, The Missouri River and Adaptive Management:
Protecting Ecological Function and Legal Process, 80 NEB. L. REV. 816, 819 (2001). The Master
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During the 1990s the idea of adaptive management became much
discussed in both the scientific and legal literature. Although adaptive
management is widely touted in both, its role in environmental law to date
has been very limited. Thus far, adaptive management has been used
primarily as a resource-management tool in such areas as fisheries
management or public-land management. 16' Although often proposed as a
needed component of environmental regulation, adaptive management has
not yet been integrated into environmental regulatory programs. Adaptive
management is not yet pervasively used in environmental law. It has only
been expressly adopted in four statutes.' 62 The Department of the Army, the
Army Corps of Engineers, the Forest Service, and EPA have all expressly
incorporated adaptive management into their regulations. 163  Although the
success of adaptive management as a component of environmental regulation
is still uncertain, it has still proven to be an effective approach for the
management of complex ecosystems.
V. Why Some Scientific Ideas Stick and Spread
A useful framework for evaluating what conditions are significant for a
scientific idea to gain currency in the law and policy arenas is found in
Manual is a system of written instructions for the operation of the Missouri River Basin. Id. at 834.
The Master Manual was originally prepared in 1960. Id. In 1989, the Corps agreed to revise the
Master Manual. Id. This was the first time the Master Manual would be subject to review under
NEPA. Id. During the NEPA review process, the Corps of Engineers asked the FWS for formal
consultation under the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 841. It is important to note that in 1994 FWS
had announced a policy change that all of its regulatory and other functions would be guided by the
concept of ecosystem management. Id. at 837. One of the Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives
suggested by FWS in. its biological opinion was the recommendation to adopt adaptive
management Id. at 842. FWS recommended two components of this new adaptive management
process: establishment of an interagency coordination team, and implementation of a monitoring
program. Id. All five alternatives in the RDEIS were to be "buttressed by a process known as
adaptive management." Id. at 843. The Army Corps of Engineers planned to refine the adaptive
management process in the RDEIS after it received the NRC report entitled Missouri River
Ecosystem: Exploring the Prospects for Recover. Id. at 844.
161. See, e.g., Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 549,
579 (1996) (discussing the use of adaptive management in the Clinton forest program in the Pacific
Northwest as a new direction for public-land management); Volkman & McConnaha, supra note
139, at 1255-56 (describing the introduction of adaptive management into fisheries management in
the mid- 1980s).
162. Southwest Forest Health and Wildfire Prevention Act of 2004, 16 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6707
(Supp. V 2005); Estuaries and Clean Waters Act of 2000, 33 U.S.C. § 2903 (2000); Water
Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114, § 2031, 121 Stat. 1041, 1082 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962-3); Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
140, § 633, 121 Stat. 1492, 1686 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17212).
163. Environmental Analysis of Army Actions, 32 C.F.R. § 651.5(d)(10)(v) (2008); National
Forest System Land Management Planning, 36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (2008); Programmatic Regulations
for the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Act, 33 C.F.R. § 385.3 (2008); Criteria and
Standards for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. § 125.93 (2006)
(suspended by 72 Fed. Reg. 37,107 (July 9, 2007)).
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Malcolm Gladwell's 2000 bestselling book, The Tipping Point. 64  The
significance of the who, what, where, and when of the development of a
scientific idea to its adoption in the law parallels the significance of these
factors to determining whether and to what extent any new idea or trend is
adopted and spread. Sociologists have studied various factors that contribute
to new ideas or trends gaining currency. 65 Many of the ideas gleaned from
these studies have been integrated into Gladwell's book. 66  This book
explores the phenomenon of how what Gladwell describes as "social
epidemics" work. 167 The term "social epidemic" encompasses a large range
of phenomena, including the emergence of fashion trends, crime waves,
books becoming bestsellers, and a variety of other social trends that emerge
and rapidly spread throughout our culture. 68 According to Gladwell, one
critical characteristic of social epidemics is that, rather than occurring
gradually, change happens "at one dramatic moment," which he describes as
the "tipping point."' 169 Three factors appear to be critical in creating a social
epidemic: (1) the law of the few, (2) the stickiness factor, and (3) the power
of context.' 70 The "law of the few" holds that in any given situation, a very
few people will have the most influence.'17 The "stickiness factor" relates to
the specific characteristics that make a particular idea memorable enough to
be adopted and spread. 72 The "power of context" is based on the idea that
human beings are much more sensitive to their environment than they may
seem, and thus, contextual circumstances can have significant influence over
individuals' actions. 73 These three rules explain the circumstances under
which social epidemics typically occur and provide a roadmap for how to
promote future social epidemics.
174
To attempt to identify possible reasons why some scientific
developments, such as risk assessment, find a home in the law, I began by
looking at each of the three scientific developments discussed in this Article
in terms of the who, what, where, and when. First, I examined who
developed the idea and whether the position or stature of the person or
persons who developed the idea (the "who") impacted the acceptance of the
idea by the legal and policy community. Next, I examined the nature of the
164. GLADWELL, supra note 3.
165. See, e.g., id. at 282 endnote (listing several sociological studies of diffusion and collective
behavior).
166. See id. (noting that the Tipping Point model has been described in several classic works of
sociology).
167. See id. at 21 (introducing the concept of social epidemics).
168. See id. at 14 (describing the variety of phenomena covered by the Tipping Point concept).
169. Id. at9.
170. Id. at 29.
171. Id. at 22.
172. Id. at 25.
173. Id. at 28-29.
174. Id. at 29.
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scientific idea (the "what") to see if any pattern emerged. As to the "where,"
I looked to see where the idea first got a foothold-in the general public
debate or in the law itself-to see if one tends to follow from the other.
Finally, I considered the time at which the idea was developed to see if the
timing of the development of the idea correlated with other events that may
have facilitated the movement of the idea into the legal and policy realm.
These factors fit neatly into the Tipping Point framework.
A. The Law of the Few (The Who)
The "law of the few" holds that in any given situation, a very few
people will have the most influence.175 Research into the origins of social
epidemics reveals that they are driven by the influences of a very few
exceptional people. 76 In The Tipping Point, Gladwell explains how word of
mouth, as opposed to concerted advertising or sales approaches, is one of the
most important factors in the spreading of an idea or trend.1 77 The success of
the spread of an idea is therefore largely dependent on the social abilities of
those few individuals who influence the word-of-mouth spreading of an
idea.178 Gladwell groups these exceptionally socially gifted people into three
categories: 179 (1) connectors, people who have special gifts in bringing
together others from different social and professional circles,180 (2) mavens,
people who are obsessed with collecting information and have the desire to
share their knowledge with others,' 8' and (3) salesmen, people who have the
skills necessary to persuade others of their views.
182
The need for connectors, mavens, and salespeople to turn an idea into a
social epidemic also applies to getting scientific ideas to be accepted and
widely used in the law. An examination of the roles that scientists and policy
makers have played in developing and disseminating the three scientific
ideas discussed in this Article suggests that where environmental agencies,
such as EPA, fail to employ connectors, mavens, or salespeople in key
positions, a scientific idea is not likely to catch on in the Agency.
As described above, risk assessment was initially developed primarily
by the FDA and later refined by EPA with considerable input from the NRC,
whereas both adaptive management and emergy synthesis were developed by
university scientists. Adaptive management was developed by scientists at
the University of British Columbia and subsequently refined when C.S.
Holling directed the IASA in Vienna. H.T. Odum, a professor of
175. Id. at 33.
176. Id. at 19-22.
177. Id. at 32.
178. Id. at 33.
179. Id. at 34.
180. Id. at 38.
181. Id. at 67.
182. Id. at 70.
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environmental engineering sciences at the University of Florida, developed
emergy analysis. The subsequent expansion and refinement of emergy
synthesis resulted primarily from the work of researchers at the University of
Florida or researchers who received all or part of their graduate education at
the university under the guidance of Dr. Odum and his proteges. Of the three
scientific developments discussed in this Article, risk assessment alone has
become an important part of environmental law and policy. Unlike the
developers of emergy and adaptive management, who were university
researchers, the individuals who were critical to the development and spread
of risk assessment were government employees.
In Tipping Point parlance, researchers such as Dr. Odum and Dr.
Holling would be considered the mavens. These researchers were driven to
gather information, develop ideas, and solve problems. They sought to help
society by finding ways to address its problems with scientific solutions.
They may have even been skilled at communicating their ideas to others.
However, for an idea to spread, it is not sufficient to merely rely on mavens:
connectors and salespeople are equally important. Unlike emergy synthesis
and adaptive management, risk assessment appears to have had connectors
and salespeople involved in spreading its virtues. For example, agency
scientists and policy makers at the FDA and EPA appear to have played the
role of connector, reaching out to the research community to find ideas that
they could bring back to the agencies and tailor to fit the agencies' needs.
8 3
Moreover, it could be said that EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus
played the role of salesperson, praising the virtues of risk assessment and
persuading his staff and others that risk assessment was the proper tool for
answering the difficult risk-based questions EPA faced.184 Emergy synthesis
and adaptive management do not appear to have had clear connectors
showing agencies how these scientific ideas could be used. Nor do they have
salespeople, such as a Ruckelshaus, with the credibility, stature, and
persuasive ability to sell the ideas. Perhaps emergy synthesis and adaptive
management would have gained more traction had there been connectors and
salespeople championing these ideas. As described in more detail below,
part of the reason for the lack of connectors may be related to the cultural
shift that has occurred in regulatory agencies such as EPA since the
privatization and outsourcing trends began.
Because risk assessment was sought out and developed by the federal
agencies themselves, it was easily incorporated and quickly spread
throughout the legal and policy arena. Moreover, Ruckelshaus's
commitment to risk assessment and his leadership integrating risk assessment
into virtually every program within EPA appears to be a critical factor in risk
assessment's ubiquity.181 Courts also played a role in encouraging the
183. See supra subpart IV(B).
184. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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widespread use of risk assessment. In the 1980 case Benzene, the court
invalidated an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule
lowering the acceptable level of benzene exposure because OSHA had not
demonstrated "significant risks."'186 To determine whether a significant risk
exists, it is necessary to engage in some type of assessment to measure risk.
Consequently, OSHA and other agencies began to focus on more quantitative
risk-assessment methodologies that would assist them in withstanding
judicial scrutiny.187 Finally, in 1983, NRC issued a report on risk assessment
that helped to standardize the methodology and that established risk
assessment as a mainstay of environmental and health policy.'88 The
confluence of these events in the early 1980s appears to have firmly planted
quantitative risk assessment in the environmental and health decision-making
processes throughout the federal government.
Neither adaptive management nor emergy synthesis has been sought out
by federal agencies to address any pressing need resulting from new
congressional or judicial mandates. Likewise, neither idea has had a
champion such as Ruckelshaus within the high ranks of government.
Instead, both were developed in universities by research scientists on their
own initiatives. 89 Thus, although both ideas have the potential to greatly
improve environmental decision making, agencies have not taken ownership
of the ideas.
Both the late Dr. Odum and Dr. Holling are internationally renowned
scholars. In fact, Dr. Odum and his brother Eugene commonly are thought of
as the fathers of modem ecology, and their names are known to virtually
everyone who has ever taken a college ecology course.' 90 Nevertheless,
Odum and Holling's ideas have not been adopted by environmental agencies
for incorporation into environmental decision making. The fact that a
scientific development comes out of a well-respected research institution or
from an internationally renowned researcher appears to be of little import.
186. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 653-55
(1980).
187. See David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System:
Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 17,
25 (2005) (stating that in order to meet the Supreme Court's mandate in Benzene, OSHA had spent
considerable time preparing detailed quantitative risk assessments related to its health standards);
Charles F. Mills III, Global RBCA: Its Implementation, Foundation in Risk-Based Theory, and
Implications, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 101, 110-11 (2006) (discussing judicial affirmation of
OSHA's use of quantitative risk assessment post-Benzene).
188. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of emergy
synthesis); supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of adaptive
management).
190. Sholto Maud & Dino Cevolatti, Realising the Enlightenment: H.T Odum's Energy
Systems Language qua G. W. v Liebniz's Characteristica Umversalis, 178 ECOLOGICAL MODELLING
279, 283 (2004) (referring to H.T. Odum as the "'father' of systems ecology"); Ari L. Goldman,
Eugene P. Odum Dies at 88: Founded Modern Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at A21
(referring to Eugene Odum as "the father of modem ecology").
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Of the three scientific approaches discussed in this Article, risk assessment,
the only of the three that was not developed by an internationally respected
researcher, has become used widely in environmental decision making. As
described above, risk assessment was developed primarily by federal
regulatory agencies, such as FDA and EPA, both of which were in need of a
methodology to evaluate risks under their statutory mandates from Congress.
Both agencies were actively looking for a methodology to use and were
supported by the work of NRC, which further developed the methodology. It
appears that one of the most important factors in determining whether a
scientific idea will be incorporated into the law is whether the regulatory
agency is actively seeking a scientific methodology or approach to address a
specific concern or to answer a specific question, particularly when ordered
to do so by Congress. University scientists may toil in laboratories or in the
field for decades developing extremely useful ideas, but unless the agencies
are looking for such ideas, they are unlikely to be embraced.
B. Stickiness (The What)
The second factor identified in The Tipping Point as being necessary
for an idea to catch on is referred to as the "stickiness factor." "Stickiness" is
a characteristic of successful ideas.1 91 In order for an idea to catch on and
spread, it must be "sticky," meaning that the idea must be memorable and
must move people to act. 192  The idea of "stickiness" has been further
developed in the recent book Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and
Others Die.193  This book posits that while some ideas are inherently
interesting and others are not, there is something more at work that
determines why some interesting ideas fail to catch on. 194  The book
identifies six principles of "sticky" ideas: (1) simplicity, which depends on
stripping an idea to its core; (2) unexpectedness, which suggests that an idea
must be counterintuitive to generate interest and curiosity; (3) concreteness,
which requires that an idea be explained in terms of human action using
concrete images; (4) credibility, which requires that the ideas themselves
carry their own credentials; (5) emotion, which suggests that the idea must
make people feel something; and (6) stories, which suggests that using
stories is a way to motivate people to act.
195
Applying these stickiness factors to the three examples of scientific
ideas suggests that risk assessment is stickier than either adaptive
management or emergy synthesis. First, at least on its face, risk assessment
is simpler than the other ideas. Second, risk assessment is easier to describe
191. GLADWELL, supra note 3, at 91.
192. Id. at 25.
193. CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS SURVIVE AND OTHERS
DIE 12-13 (2007).
194. Id. at 8-10.
195. See id. at 14-18 (introducing the six principles of sticky ideas).
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in terms of concrete examples. Third, risk assessment, at least as it has been
presented to the public, seems to carry with it an air of credibility in that it
appears to be highly objective and quantitative and to result in clear-cut
answers. Finally, because risk assessment is used to analyze human risks
from dreaded diseases, such as cancer, it can be presented via real-life stories
that evoke emotional responses.
One reason why risk assessment may have been so readily integrated
into legal policy is that, at least on its face, it is easy to understand and
appears to be a relatively straightforward method to provide clear answers to
technical questions. However, although relatively easy to explain and to
understand, it is rife with difficulties, prone to error, and yields often
uncertain results.1 96 Most of the difficulties of risk assessment occur during
the second and third steps of the process. During the second step, where the
relationship between the dose and the probability of harm is determined,
complexity and uncertainty result from the fact that results must be
extrapolated from animal tests to humans, or from tests on one species of
animal to another species of animal. Not only is there uncertainty over
whether species-to-species extrapolation is valid, but even within species,
individual variability and susceptibility also make extrapolation inherently
suspect.1 97 Moreover, due to the nature of laboratory animal testing, results
from tests conducted with extremely high dosing must be extrapolated to
lower dosing.' 98 To account for these problems inherent in animal testing,
"safety" factors are applied to ensure that results are sufficiently
conservative. 199 With regard to the third step in risk assessment, uncertainty
arises from the huge variability in exposure that is likely to result in different
locations, with different lifestyles, and because of other variables. Risk
assessment is considered by critics to be overly quantitative and reductive.
20 0
Finally, perhaps the least understood issue with the method: risk assessment
does not tell us anything about what level of risk is acceptable as a matter of
policy, how to reduce risks to acceptable levels, or how to take into account
economic or other social costs in deciding how to manage risk.20 ' Risk
196. RED BOOK, supra note 75, at 48-49.
197. See id. (noting the "clear disadvantage" of animal studies in risk assessment due to species
differences between animals and humans, and further acknowledging that "[d]ifferences among
animal species ... can account for toxicity differences").
198. See d. at 60-62 (describing the extrapolation of threshold-level doses eliciting toxic
responses in lab animals to humans in dose-response models for noncancer toxic effects); see also
Work Group on Risk Assessment, Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, supra note 97, at 260-62
(describing mathematical models "proposed to deal with the problem of low-dose extrapolation").
199. See id at 62-63 (describing the use of the "uncertainty-factor" approach to estimate "safe"
exposure).
200. See David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for Environmental
Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 124-27 (2005) (discussing multiple critiques of risk
assessment).
201. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Hayward, The Same Mold Story?: What Toxic Mold Is Teaching Us
About Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 83 N.C. L. REv. 518, 550 (2005) (distinguishing between
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assessment, in itself, merely provides a way to determine the amount of risk
posed in a given situation, which can inform policy decisions regarding risk
management. Thus, although risk assessment on its face is easily understood
and has a superficial appeal, it is rife with complexity and uncertainty and
provides only limited information. Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings
and complexities, risk assessment has been embraced by the law.
202
By contrast, adaptive management and emergy synthesis do not have
the superficial appeal of risk assessment. By their very nature, they
acknowledge the complexity of natural systems. Adaptive management also
is based on the concept that natural systems are constantly changing, adding
another layer of complexity.20 3 Neither attempts to hide behind a veil of
simplicity by being highly reductive, like risk assessment. Moreover,
adaptive management, in particular, unabashedly embraces uncertainty,
whereas risk assessment attempts to eliminate uncertainty by imposing
overly simplistic "safety" factors to disguise what are inherently uncertain
results. 20 4 Consequently, these complex and difficult-to-understand ideas are
not easily integrated into a legal system that seeks simplicity and certainty.
Agencies do not appear to be looking for new methodologies that further
complicate their jobs and that are not easily translated to nonexpert
government leaders and the public. Emergy synthesis is not easily
understood by nonexperts. This is perhaps due to the fact that most
laypeople are not comfortable with concepts like thermodynamics, which is
at the root of emergy synthesis. Finally, it is interesting to note that the term
"emergy" is not a commonly used term and is often considered to be a
typographical error. Thus, it is possible that the name itself has made the
approach less accessible and less attractive to those who might benefit from
its use.
In addition to the simplicity factor, risk assessment appears to be
stickier than the other models due to the fact that it can be described in more
concrete terms using more concrete examples than can the other ideas. For
example, risk assessment can be described as a way to determine how many
people exposed to a certain dose of a chemical substance will contract
cancer. Examples to help illustrate can be given using laypeople's everyday
experiences. For instance, risk assessment can be presented in terms of what
"[s]cientifically determined threshold effect levels" resulting from risk assessment and the
"regulatory standards" of risk management, "which incorporate[s] significant policy considerations
such as the notion of 'acceptable' exposure levels") (citing 2 PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM'N ON
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT., RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN
REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING 55, 84-85 (1997)).
202. See, e.g., RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT 92 (May 2003), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfin?Deid
=54944 (providing guidance for assessing risk from environmental stressors).
203. See INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, supra note 120, at 33 ("Ecological
systems are not static but are in continual change. .. and this dynamic change determines part of
the structure, diversity, and viability of ecological systems.").
204. Id at 8-9.
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percentage of people who get into car accidents not using their seat belts will
die, or what percentage of people who smoke cigarettes are likely to get lung
cancer. These concrete examples are part of our everyday lives and therefore
immediately connect with most people. Not only are these concrete
examples easy to relate to, but they also provide a clear, concrete action that
individuals can take to reduce their risk, e.g., wearing seat belts or quitting
smoking. Such simple, concrete examples for adaptive management and
emergy synthesis, on the other hand, are not as easy to come by. It is more
difficult to explain to a layperson via concrete examples what emergy is, why
it matters, and what specific actions they should take in response to a
particular emergy synthesis. Likewise, adaptive management by its very
nature is not particularly concrete because it is concerned with the changing
nature of systems and the iterative process that should be used to address
changing circumstances and changing information. Despite these
difficulties, however, it is possible to present these ideas in more concrete
ways with clearer paths of action. For example, emergy synthesis could be
explained in terms of a fifty-year-old tree in a backyard, which could be
valued in a number of ways. You could burn the tree and measure its energy
output and assign a market value to the number of BTUs of output.
Alternatively, you could sell the tree to a lumber company and assign a value
based on the price the lumber company is willing to pay for the tree. Using
emergy synthesis, you could determine all of the energy that went into
creating the tree and the services it provides, including fifty years of solar
energy, water, nutrients, and human labor in pruning the tree. The value of
the tree from this perspective is likely to be dramatically higher than the
value based on the amount of energy released from burning the tree or the
price a lumber company would be willing to pay for the tree. Such an
analysis could be used to demonstrate that there is great value in allowing the
tree to stand rather than cutting it down for a relatively small amount of
money. To date, emergy and adaptive-management scientists have not been
successful at packaging their ideas in simple, concrete ways or using
concrete examples that prompt people to take action.
Similarly, with regard to the credibility and emotion components of
stickiness, risk assessment has been an easier sell. Despite the complexities
and uncertainties associated with risk assessment, it is typically presented as
a very scientific, objective, and quantitative method in which information is
fed into the assessment and "the answer" is spit out. Of course, this is a great
oversimplification, but because risk assessment has been presented in this
overly simplified way, it brings with it an air of credibility. Emergy
synthesis and adaptive management, on the other hand, embrace complexity.
Neither emergy synthesis nor adaptive management purports to provide "the
answer." As described above, a determination that a resource or service has
a high emergy value says nothing about whether it is a positive value or
negative value. Such determinations must be made at the policy-making
level. Similarly, adaptive management inherently recognizes uncertainties
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Harnessing the Power of Science
and changes in our understanding of the world. Accordingly, both emergy
and adaptive management appear to be less objective, quantitative, and
absolute, which probably undermines the credibility afforded them.
Finally, because risk assessment came about in response to the
concern that certain environmental exposures cause cancer in humans, it has
been shrouded in human emotion from the beginning. Cancer is a dreaded,
insidious disease that often leads to death and for which the medical
treatment itself can be devastating. Emergy synthesis and adaptive
management, both of which typically are used to evaluate effects on natural
systems and methods to minimize or manage such effects, do not carry with
them that type of direct, human emotional charge. Accordingly, emergy
synthesis and adaptive management appear to be intrinsically less sticky and
less easily made to be sticky than risk assessment.
C. The Power of Context (The Where & The When)
The Tipping Point describes the "power of context" as the third factor
that determines whether an idea will catch on. °5 The power of context
relates to the fact that social epidemics are sensitive to the social
environment in both the time and the place in which they occur. °6 For an
idea to catch on and spread, the circumstances must be right. In other words,
the idea must be in the right place at the right time. As described below, risk
assessment came into its own during a time and under circumstances that
were not only amenable, but desperate, for it. To date, the circumstances do
not appear to be ripe for emergy synthesis or adaptive management.
1. The Where.-One variable to consider in determining the extent to
which a scientific idea gets picked up by the law is the extent to which it is
widely known by the public at large. To attempt to get a sense of the
relationship between a scientific idea's prevalence in general and its
prevalence in the legal scholarship, judicial decisions, and administrative
arena, I conducted the following computer search on Google, Westlaw, and
ISI Knowledge Web. 7
205. GLADWELL, supra note 3, at 139.
206. Id.
207. See ISI Web of Knowledge, http://portal.isiknowledge.com.
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Figure 1: Relative Prevalence of Scientific Ideas
Westlaw
IST Journals
Knowledge & Law Federal Federal
Search Term Google Web Reviews Cases Register C.F.R.
"Risk Assessment" 10,200,000 78,429 9,245 1,188 9,843 308
"Risk Assessment" 978,000 3,032 6,630 504 4,919 101
& Environment
"Adaptive 495,000 598 604 80 1,045 21
Management"
"Adaptive
Management" & 458,000 61 551 57 386 12
Environment
"Emergy" 84,300* 128* 22** 19*** 61*** 0
"Emergy" & 41,500 34 0 0 0 0
Environment
* The relatively few hits using the term "emergy" may be due to the fact that, although the
methodology has been in existence for decades, the term "emergy" itself has only been
used since the early 1990s. Prior to that, various terms, including "embodied energy" and
"ecoenergetics," were used.
** Of the twenty-two "emergy" hits, all but one were either a proper noun denoting a
person or company or a typographical error, typically where either the word "energy" or
"emerge" appeared to be intended.
*** All of which were a proper noun denoting a person or company name.
Although the number of hits from Google and Westlaw searches is
admittedly an extremely crude metric, it does provide some sense of the
acceptance and use of the respective scientific approaches in the law and in
the broader public arena. In general, there appears to be a pattern in which
the prevalence of a scientific idea decreases roughly proportionally as you
move from a generic Google search to law reviews, legal journals, and
Federal Register notices (which have roughly equivalent numbers of hits) to
federal judicial opinions and finally to the Code of Federal Regulations.
While such a crude analysis certainly should not be afforded too much
weight, it does reveal a general trend wherein the prevalence of a scientific
idea in the legal arena is a roughly proportional fraction of its prevalence in
the broader public arena. One explanation for this trend could be that it takes
a high level of prevalence of an idea in the general public arena before the
idea will be accepted by the legal community. However, this is not the only
conclusion that could be drawn. It is possible that the prevalence of a
scientific idea in the legal arena leads to a situation where the idea becomes a
ubiquitous part of the broader public debate. Whichever came first-the
legal or the public-a relationship does exist, and perhaps more significantly,
a pattern emerges wherein the prevalence of an idea in the legal scholarly
literature and in the administrative-policy arena, as captured by the Federal
Register, are proportionally greater than the prevalence of the idea in judicial
opinions or codified regulations. One explanation is that it is not until a
scientific development is vetted in the legal-scholarship and agency-policy
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arenas that the idea is ripe to be integrated into the courtroom or codified as a
regulation.
2. The When.-Risk assessment came into its own during the heyday of
the environmental era of the 1970s. According to former EPA Administrator
William K. Reilly, risk assessment gained currency in environmental
decision making in the 1970s and 1980s in large part because, during that
time, EPA was charged with implementing a large number of programs
under the newly adopted CAA, CWA, RCRA, CERLCA, and TSCA.08
Thus, according to Reilly, "even the most idealistic and protective of the
EPA staff' realized that they could not eliminate all risk and had to allocate
resources in such a way as to address the most significant risks.20 9 At the
same time, technological advances allowed for the first time for substances to
be detected in extremely minute quantities, forcing EPA to acknowledge that
it could not reasonably require the elimination of all traces of chemicals in
every medium and therefore had to make difficult choices regarding what
level of risk would be considered acceptable. To make these decisions, a
methodology for predicting levels of impact was necessary. Despite the
complexities, uncertainties, and controversy surrounding it, risk assessment
stepped in to fill this need and soon became the dominant approach used by
EPA. Risk assessment also provided a scientific rationale for EPA to defend
the decisions it made.
While both adaptive management and emergy synthesis date back to the
1970s, it was not until the 1990s that both achieved widespread acceptance in
the scientific community. By the 1990s, the culture of EPA had radically
changed from what it was in the 1970s. Moreover, at the time risk
assessment became widespread, the focus of environmental law was media-
based and human-health-based. The fact that most of the laws administered
by EPA are media-based also appears to make risk assessment, wherein
individual chemicals or pollutants can be tested in individual media to
determine the level of risk they present, an easy fit. Adaptive management
and emergy synthesis, on the other hand, are not by nature media-based.
Instead, they both recognize and attempt to understand the complexity of
nature systems and take a holistic approach to evaluating the impact of
human activity to such systems. It was not until much later that the approach
of looking at the impact of one chemical at a time in one medium (e.g., air,
water) was called into question. 21°
208. Interview by Dr. Dennis Williams with William K. Reilly, Adm'r, EPA (Sept. 1995),
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/reilly/20.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2007).
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining Public Health,
93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 243 (2005) (contending that the current regulatory scheme is broadly ignorant
of the effect of multiple-pollutant interaction); Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50




Moreover, as former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle has stated,
during the early years of the Agency, EPA viewed itself as being on a
learning curve, and it continued to take in new information and to adjust its
activities accordingly.211 In more recent years, the culture of the Agency
appears not to be one of "learning" but instead appears to be one of
"justifying.' '212 Most federal environmental laws came into being during the
1970s and 1980s. Since that time, significant scientific advancements have
been made, particularly in the ecological sciences. Scientists have begun to
recognize the need to look more holistically at ecosystems.213 This broader
holistic approach inherently brought with it a need for approaches that deal
with, rather than ignore, the complexities and uncertainties inherent in
214
ecological systems. Unfortunately, at the same time researchers were
gaining a better understanding of the complex nature of ecological systems,
the public and our political systems were becoming more skeptical of science
and less open to incorporating new scientific developments into the law.215
In this new anti-science environment, science frequently is used to justify
predetermined results. If the scientific information does not support the
predetermined result, it is ignored or discredited as being "junk science. ', 216
As described by Professor Holly Doremus elsewhere in this Issue, there has
been a trend in recent years to politicize science either by administration
officials pressuring agency scientists to alter results to support a particular
policy or political agenda, or by science being criticized as junk science
whenever it does not support a particular political agenda.21 7  Such
211. Interview by Dr. Dennis Williams with Douglas M. Costle, Adm'r, EPA, in Vt. and
McLean, Va. (Aug. 4-5, 1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/reilly/20.htm
(last updated Sept. 21, 2007).
212. See, e.g., CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 26 (2005) (decrying the
substitution of political considerations over scientific considerations); Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules
Weakened at Bush's Behest: EPA Scrambles to Justify Action, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2008, at Al
(describing how EPA recently had to justify a decision of the Bush Administration weakening
ozone rules); Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., The Junk Science of George W. Bush, THE NATION, Mar. 8,
2004 (describing several instances where EPA was forced to justify some of its decisions).
213. See, e.g., Grumbine, supra note 135, at 28-29 (indicating a need for a more inclusive
ecosystem-management approach); Profeta, supra note 130, at 71-75 (arguing that ecosystems are
complex and interconnected).
214. See, e.g., Profeta, supra note 130, at 84-85 (arguing that environmental regulation must
address the dynamic uncertainties present in ecosystems).
215. See, e.g., Pouyat, supra note 4, at 281-84 (noting legislative reluctance to incorporate
biological and ecological scientific developments into laws).
216. Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of
Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
2003, at 63.
217. Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEXAS L.
REV. 1601, 611-617 (2008); see also Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law:
Reforming the Information Quality Act, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (2006) (suggesting that the
perception that the government was using "junk science" led to the passage of the Information
Quality Act); Linda A. Malone, What Do Snowmobiles, Mercury Emissions, Greenhouse Gases and
Runoff Have in Common?: The Controversy Over "Junk Science," 9 CHAP. L. REV. 365, 365-77
(2006) (describing the recent trend to use science to support political preferences with regard to the
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politicization of science results in fewer high-quality scientists desiring to
work for EPA for fear that their work will be distorted or attacked as junk
science. 21 8 Likewise, those scientists who do stay at the agency may be more
willing to bend their science to fit the political agenda rather than risk losing
their jobs or having their work attacked as being junk.
During the early years of EPA, the agency was staffed with scientists
and others concerned with developing and implementing regulations and
policies to protect human health and the environment.219 Starting with the
Reagan administration in the early 1980s, the emphasis shifted to be one of
working with industry and with an ever-greater emphasis on economic
considerations. 220 Along with this shift, another shift was taking place which
derided "big government" and sought to reduce the size of government in
part by privatizing and outsourcing government functions. Many of the jobs,
including scientific jobs, previously held by EPA and other agency
employees were outsourced to private organizations. Jobs that once required
scientists were filled with employees who, rather than being good at or caring
about science and keeping up with new scientific developments, had good
administrative skills. 22' Scientists who once staffed environmental agencies
such as EPA soon found their roles changing from scientists to project
managers. 2  A major culture shift occurred.
Of course, in environmental regulation, science is an important
component. Nevertheless, EPA gets most of its scientific information from
outside of the agency. 3  Except in its earliest years, EPA has never
identified itself as a "science agency. 224 Instead it has identified itself as a
regulatory and enforcement agency. 225 Since its inception, EPA has become
less and less science-oriented.226 Examples of this trend are seen in changes
both in EPA's science budget and workforce makeup over the past thirty-plus
use of snowmobiles in national parks, greenhouse gases, and mercury emissions from power
plants); Kennedy, supra note 212.
218. MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 64
(1999).
219. See William Sanjour, In Name Only, SIERRA, Sept. 1992 (contrasting the early years of
EPA, which attracted true environmental enthusiasts to the organization, with more recent
challenges of staff crossover between EPA and the very industries it aims to regulate).
220. One of the worst examples of the trend away from science during the Reagan
Administration was when EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch fired most of the scientists on EPA's
Scientific Advisory Board to replace them with scientists who were "good, solid Republicans." E.
Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003,
at 45.
221. See POWELL, supra note 218, at 57 ("The long-term trend for EPA's science has been
downward.").
222. See id. at 61 ("[B]ecause much of their time is devoted to contractor management, many of
EPA's scientists are unable to practice their craft.").
223. Id. at 57.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 57-58.
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years. In 1973, approximately one-third of EPA's total budget was dedicated
to its Office of Research and Development (ORD). 227 The science budget
declined over the 1970s, and by 1980 only approximately 20% of EPA's
budget was devoted to science.228 This science budget suffered substantial
decreases during the Reagan Administration, such that in the mid-1980s, the
ORD accounted for only approximately 3-4% of EPA's total budget. 229 By
the mid-1990s the ORD's budget was still only approximately 7% of the
total.230 This level of science funding is surprisingly small for an agency
whose work is so heavily dependent on complex scientific issues. By
contrast, FDA's scientific research budget is approximately 20% of its total
budget.231
Although EPA has a large number of employees with scientific
educations, due to decreasing emphasis on scientific research and
outsourcing of scientific work, most of these employees' duties are contract
management, as opposed to science.232 Because these EPA employees with
scientific education, including those with graduate degrees, do not get to
practice their craft as scientists, 233 their scientific skills become rusty, and
they are not as likely to keep up with scientific developments.234 Starting in
the 1980s, more and more of EPA's scientific work began to be done by
contractors. By 1991, 80% of EPA's research and development budget was
paid to outside science contractors.235 Thus, EPA's overall trend has been a
dramatic decline in science resources, while, at the same time, those
resources devoted to science are primarily going to outside contractors. The
combination of these two factors has resulted in EPA's remaining science
staff spending their time on contract management and administrative work
rather than scientific work.236
By necessity, when a job changes from being one of a scientist to being
one of a project manager charged with administering a contract and
overseeing the work of outsourced scientists, the role of the in-house
employee becomes dramatically altered. Like an in-house corporate attorney




230. Id. It should be noted that looking only at the ORD's budget may not fully capture EPA's
science budget because scientific resources are also devoted to scientific work in the various
program offices. However, it is difficult to separate out which portion of program resources are
devoted to science. Id. at 60.
231. Id. at 60.
232. Id. at 60-61.
233. Id. at 61.
234. Id. at 61-62.
235. Id. at 62.
236. Id. at 61-64. Another criticism of contracting out science is that it can result in agency
resources being spent to hire like-minded cronies who will manipulate their work to fit the political
agenda of those who are writing their paychecks. Id. at 38.
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herself with contract matters, administrative bureaucracy, quality control,
scope of work, deliverables, etc., rather than with the actual, substantive
scientific issues. Scientists who desire to do real scientific work typically are
not interested in project management. Those that are interested in
administrative work are less likely to view themselves as scientists or to take
ownership of the science and are less likely to keep up with new scientific
developments or push for their inclusion in the law. At the same time,
contracting firms doing scientific work for the agency have no economic or
professional incentive to try new things. They are rewarded for doing what
is in their scope of work and for completing the deliverables in their contract.
Incentives exist to get more contracts and make more money. No incentive
exists to take the time to learn about new scientific developments, to
determine how they could be used by the agency, and to convince the agency
to adopt them.237 Proposals to further outsource and privatize science at EPA
and other agencies continue to be made.238
Another potential contributor to the cultural shift at EPA is the generic
tendency for ambitiousness and enthusiasm to erode in governmental and
other organizations after the initial momentum from their founding push has
worn off. Perhaps part of EPA's culture shift simply reflects the human and
organizational reality that at some point the honeymoon ends and a less
exciting, less hopeful, and more mundane reality sets in. Another related
issue is that due to EPA's regulatory focus and need to respond quickly to the
environmental or political crisis of the moment, even in the face of limited
information, many research scientists who are more interested in long-term,
quality research are not attracted to the EPA workforce, or if they are
attracted, they do not stay for long.239
One observation regarding the timing of the introduction of risk
assessment versus the other scientific approaches is that risk assessment
appears to have been in the right place at the right time. During the heyday
of the development of environmental law and regulation, there was
tremendous pressure for a scientific methodology to make predictions about
risk and to inform regulatory decision making in a way that dispelled the
arguments of critics that environmentalists sought to eliminate all risk,
regardless of the economic or social costs. Risk assessment stepped in to fill
the need. However, in addition to being a time of pressing need, but it was
also a time when environmental-particularly human health-risks were at
237. See POWELL, supra note 218, at 63 tbl.3.5 (analyzing the breakdown of EPA employees
with doctorates, which as of 1993 equaled less than 10% of those with college degrees).
238. See, e.g., U.S. Researchers Fear Job Losses from Privatization Drive, 424 NATURE 478,
478 (2003) (describing the Bush Administration's proposal to contract out federal scientific projects
at EPA, National Park Service, and National Institutes of Health); Press Release, Pub. Employees
for Envtl. Responsibility, U.S. Army to Contract out Environmental Staff (June 20, 2007), available
at http://www.peer.org/news/print detail.php?rowjd=875 (describing the U.S. Army's attempt to
privatize its environmental, natural, and cultural-resource functions).
239. POWELL, supra note 218, at 63.
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the forefront of the public's mind. During the 1970s and 1980s, with high
profile hazardous-waste-contamination incidents such as Love Canal, the
public became increasingly concerned with the risk of cancer from
environmental contaminants. Consequently, EPA's risk assessment was
primarily used as a means to evaluate cancer risk to humans.
Another important characteristic of that time period is also that the
public had not yet become as jaded and skeptical of science as it is now. The
post-World War II years marked a time when the public not only trusted
science, but also put great hope for the future in technological and scientific
advances. Americans believed that technology could solve our problems and
such beliefs were fortified by scientific success stories, such as putting
humans into space and ultimately on the moon. By the 1980s, however, the
public became more skeptical of technology.240 Technological develop-
ments, such as the modem products of chemistry that had improved the daily
lives of average Americans, became serious problems as more and more
hazardous-waste-contamination sites were discovered. Americans became
weary of news reports on scientific studies that seemed to contradict each
other. It seemed as though one day a certain food product was considered
unhealthy and the next week that same food was considered to afford great
health benefits. Public distrust of science was encouraged by politicians who
manipulated science to fit their own agendas and who called into question the
credibility of any scientific study that did not support their political agenda
by calling it "junk science., 241 Thus, the environment for incorporating new
or different scientific approaches into environmental law in the late 1980s
through the 2000s became increasingly hostile. At the same time that there
was a need to develop scientific approaches that could address broader issues
than merely assessing the risk posed by specific doses of specific chemical
substances on specific species, the door closed on science.242
It seems likely that many factors contribute to whether a scientific idea
becomes incorporated into environmental law or policy. Moreover, using
only three scientific ideas to identify patterns or reach conclusions regarding
why some ideas are integrated into the law while others are not certainly is
not sufficient to form any conclusive results. Nevertheless, certain patterns
do emerge from the three examples, which could provide insight into how to
better integrate science into law in the future.
240. See Jon D. Miller & Rafael Pardo, Civic Scientific Literacy and Attitude to Science and
Technology: A Comparative Analysis of the European Union, the United States, Japan, and
Canada, in BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST: THE PUBLIC, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 81,
81 (Meinolf Dierkes & Claudia von Grote eds., 2000) (noting the widespread "public awe and
admiration" at scientific advances).
241. See id. at 82 (chronicling growing institutional cynicism and public awareness of
environmental damage).
242. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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VI. Lessons for the Future (How We Can)
To the extent that patterns can be discerned from this limited analysis of
three scientific developments, the following factors appear to be important in
determining whether scientific developments will be integrated into
environmental law and policy. It appears that one of the most important
factors is ensuring that EPA regains a scientific culture such that mavens,
connectors, and salespeople are available to develop new ideas, reach out to
the scientific-research community to find new ideas, find ways to incorporate
the new ideas into law and policy, and sell the new ideas to agency staff,
government leaders, and the general public. In addition, even the best ideas
are not likely to catch on unless they are sufficiently "sticky." Good
scientific ideas must be packaged and presented in a manner that takes
advantage of the principles of "stickiness." Finally, although neither
scientists nor policy makers have complete control over the particular
circumstances that exist when a particular new scientific idea is developed, it
is possible to ensure that circumstances within EPA are such that the agency
is at least open to the possibility of using new scientific developments. To
accomplish this, integrity and trust of science must be restored.
With regard to the "who," it appears that the most important factor is
that the regulatory agency itself identifies a need and seeks out science to
help it address that need. It appears that unless the agency is actually in the
market for a new scientific idea to fulfill an identified need, it will not be
open to new or different ideas despite the fact that new ideas may exist that
could greatly enhance the agency's work. No matter how prestigious the
researcher or how elite the research institution that develops an idea, it seems
that EPA, in its current form, is generally not willing to reach out to pull in
new or different scientific ideas. To create a culture at EPA in which
scientists are either developing new scientific ideas to meet policy needs or
keeping up with and seeking out new scientific ideas being developed at
research institutions, it is necessary to ensure that there are sufficient
scientific mavens and connectors who can bring together scientists and
policy makers and thereby provide a bridge between the worlds of science
and policy.
For new or different scientific ideas to be incorporated into
environmental law and policy, high-level agency staff must be motivated to
look more closely at the work being done at research universities and other
research institutions to find and try out new scientific ideas. In an era where
government leaders have consciously created a culture of distrust of science
and have intentionally ignored or distorted science where necessary to
promote their own political agendas, it is no wonder that agency personnel
are not motivated to seek out new or different scientific ideas that may not
support the political agenda of a given administration. For this to occur,
agencies must have clear direction from above that an important goal is to
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seek out better scientific approaches and to use the best science available to
make the best decisions possible.
To ensure that agencies such as EPA keep abreast of and seek out new
scientific ideas to improve their decision making, we must restore a scientific
culture to the agencies. Agencies that are asked to make decisions critical to
human-health and environmental protection based on science must respect
science and scientists. Science should not be outsourced such that scientists
within agencies are merely contract or project managers without financial or
professional incentive to keep up with new developments or to find ways to
integrate them into the activities of the agencies. Instead, agencies must have
scientists on staff who are rewarded for doing objective science, who have
professional pride, and who are tasked with keeping up with developments
and finding ways to use the best new or different scientific ideas to improve
environmental policy. In Tipping Point parlance, we need to ensure that
there are mavens, connectors, and salespeople whose skills can be used to
seek out, incorporate, and spread new scientific ideas to support
environmental decision making. The best way to provide mavens and
connectors is to shift the culture of EPA such that it puts priority on hiring
and retaining skilled scientists who are not only permitted but encouraged to
conduct scientific research, participate in scientific conferences and other
professional activities, and keep up with scientific developments. These
mavens are necessary to ensure that the agency keeps abreast of new, useful
scientific ideas. Other scientists-who, rather than being pure researchers,
are those with connections to a wide circle of other scientists and policy
makers and who have the social skills to bring scientists and policy makers
together-will be needed to ensure that good scientific ideas find their way
to the right policy people. These connectors ideally would be people with
the ability to "bridge the gap" between science and policy and who have the
skills to communicate with people in both disciplines to bring useful
scientific ideas to the right policy people and be able to demonstrate how
these new ideas might be used in the policy-and-law arena. These
connectors, or "bridgers," would be able to translate legal and scientific
concepts so that individuals involved in both disciplines could better
understand each other. More importantly, however, the connector would
have the expertise to identify areas where new scientific developments could
benefit environmental decision making and could develop proposals to
experiment with incorporating such ideas into law or policy. 243 Finally, to
243. Although an evaluation of EPA's existing Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) is beyond the
scope of this Article, in theory the SAB could fill the role of connector. Historically, however, the
SAB has had only limited success as a connector. First, SAB members are full-time researchers at
universities, companies, and other institutions and therefore have only limited time to devote to
EPA activities. Moreover, SAB has been cnticized as being overly politicized. For a further
discussion of EPA's SAB, see generally JOHN D. GRAHAM, HARNESSING SCIENCE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1991) (evaluating the SAB's regulatory science activities through
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ensure that useful ideas are actually used, salespeople are needed at the
highest levels of the agency. Leaders such as former Administrator
Ruckelshaus, who have the stature, charisma, and skills to "sell" their staff
and the public on a good idea, are necessary.
One option for ensuring that EPA is able to obtain the type of scientific
research needed to address problems faced by environmental regulators and
policy makers is an institutional change. For example, during Doug Costle's
administration at EPA, a proposal was made to create "Centers of
Excellence" on human health, ecology, and technology.244  Under the
proposed model, EPA would fund research at major universities to be used
partially for basic research and partially for research focused on solving
specific environmental problems. Almost half of a billion dollars was set
aside to fund those centers. When President Reagan took office, he cancelled
the program, and it was never revived.245 To Costle's mind this was an
enormous lost opportunity to develop balanced research systematically
focused on identifying and solving important environmental problems. A
research institution based on this model, which responds to the needs of
environmental managers while ensuring that science is conducted in a
rigorous manner and is insulated as much as possible from political
influence, could greatly enhance the incorporation of new scientific ideas
into the law. As was the case with risk assessment, if agencies ask for
research to address specific problems they are facing, it is much more likely
that the resulting research will be in a form useful to the agency and much
more likely that the agency will be willing to integrate the research into their
rule or policy development. Others have suggested ways to improve and
strengthen the role of science at EPA. These proposals have included,
among other things, the following: create a high-level advocate for science,
empower scientists to make policy recommendations, and organize a
"science watch" NGO to represent disinterested scientists in the
administrative process. 246 Another possibility is to create a nonregulatory
scientific research agency, analogous to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
which serves as the primary source of internal scientific advice for the
Department of Interior. Such an agency could be tasked with conducting
research for EPA-related purposes in an environment that is independent of
the political pressures asserted on EPA as a regulatory agency.247 USGS has
1988), and Elliott, supra note 220, at 45 (arguing for an increased role for science in policy making
at EPA).
244. Interview by Dr. Dennis Williams with Douglas M. Costle, supra note 211.
245. Id.
246. See Elliott, supra note 220, at 53-62 (outlining three proposals to improve and strengthen
the role of science at EPA).
247. Doremus, supra note 217, at 1626 (describing USGS as a nonregulatory agency that
provides the Department of Interior with its primary source of scientific advice).
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a reputation for conducting quality science in an honest and objective
manner.2
48
Of course, for good scientific ideas to be integrated into environmental
law and policy, the public's trust in science must be restored. Two things
will need to happen for this to take place. First, to the extent possible,
science must be insulated from political influence. We must go back to an
approach where scientific data are as objective as possible, and where policy
decisions are informed by science, not characterized as science. Second,
politicians and government officials must be willing to stop the assault on
science as being "junk science" merely because it does not support their
particular political agendas.
With regard to the "what," it appears that for scientific ideas to catch on
with EPA, as well as with the general public, the ideas need to be "sticky."
Although some ideas are inherently stickier than others, most ideas can be
made at least somewhat sticky. This can be accomplished by packaging and
presenting scientific ideas in ways that incorporate the principles of
stickiness. For example, scientific ideas such as emergy synthesis and
adaptive management, although inherently complex, could be made stickier
if they were boiled down to their core ideas and presented to policy makers
and the public as simpler, more streamlined ideas with clear guidance on how
they could be applied in a real-world setting. These ideas could also be made
stickier if very concrete examples and stories are used that connect to people
on an emotional level. Unfortunately, most scientists are either not adept at,
or are not interested in, boiling down complex ideas to core concepts or
presenting them in ways that make a strong human connection and prompt
individuals into action. Academics are not necessarily rewarded for making
their ideas simple and easily accessible. Even the term "emergy" itself is not
sticky. The average person does not know what the term means and is
unlikely to be able to glean its meaning from the word itself. The term
"emergy" is frequently identified as a typographical error. Nothing in the
term itself provides a concrete image that will stick in people's minds or
prompt individuals to take action. Thus, one way to make emergy stickier is
to change its name to something that is easily understood and conveys a clear
concrete message.
The "when and where" factors are perhaps where persons interested in
promoting an idea have the least power. To some extent, as seen in the case
of risk assessment, the success of a scientific idea simply depends on the idea
being in the right place at the right time. In other words, the timing of factors
such as a new congressional or judicial mandate, or a new environmental
problem or crisis, creates an environment that is ripe for new scientific ideas.
Nevertheless, there are ways to change the culture of agencies like EPA such
that they are more receptive to new or different scientific ideas. Perhaps the
248. Id.
1572 [Vol. 86:1527
Harnessing the Power of Science
most critical change that is needed to create such a receptive atmosphere is
an administration that respects science, recognizes the benefit science can
provide in informing sound decision making, and eschews political
interference in science. Leadership is needed that recognizes and respects
the divide between science and policy. Agency heads are needed who exert
leadership in directing staff to utilize new scientific approaches as they foster
an agency culture that respects scientists, hires scientists, and allows
scientists to do scientific work and take professional pride in their work.
VII. Conclusion
Environmental law and policy decisions must be informed by science.
While universities and other research institutions throughout the world
continue to develop new scientific ideas and approaches, environmental law
has failed to fully take advantage of the benefits these developments can
offer. A number of factors appear to influence whether a particular scientific
idea finds a home in the law. These factors can be categorized as relating to
the who, what, where, and when of the particular idea. Most significantly, it
appears that the environmental agencies themselves must be seeking a
scientific idea to assist them in addressing a particular congressional or
judicial mandate or to answer a scientific question they are grappling with.
To some extent, whether a scientific idea catches on depends on whether it is
packaged and presented in a manner that is memorable and that provides a
clear path of action. Perhaps more importantly, however, for agencies that
desire to seek out and integrate new or different scientific ideas or
approaches, agencies must have strong leadership encouraging them to do so,
a culture of science must exist within the agency, science must be respected
by government leaders, and agency scientists must be free to engage in
scientific work free from political pressure. If this could be accomplished,
the environmental law and policy world could benefit substantially from the
ever-growing body of scientific knowledge.
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